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The static and homogeneous nature of the existing state-of-the-art
networked systems provides asymmetric advantages to attackers that make
them easy for reconnaissance and launching the attacks. The advanced
cyberattacks (e.g., APT, DDoS, malware) cause tremendous socioeconomic
impact and losses; therefore, there is an immediate need to not only respond
to the already happened attacks but disrupt the attackers for preventing the
attacks. The concept of moving target defense (MTD) is to dynamically
change attack surface to increase uncertainty and confuse the attackers
by invalidating the attacker’s intelligence or information collected during
the reconnaissance or procedures to launch the attacks. Software-defined
networking (SDN) has emerged as a promising technology that provides
flexibility and programmability to networked systems, which facilitates the
implementation of the MTD operations for cybersecurity. MTD research based
on SDN environments is in an infant stage since both MTD and SDN research
areas have emerged relatively recently.
Identifying hosts and vulnerable services (e.g., IP addresses and TCP/UDP
ports) of the target systems is a precursory step for the vast majority
of the cyberattacks. Network address space randomization, random host
mutation, and ports hopping are commonly used network address shuffling
MTD approaches. However, there are problems in these existing MTD
approaches. First, these MTD mechanisms randomize IP addresses or port
numbers of a host mapping them to a virtual IP or port in a one-to-one
manner, which requires more IP addresses to satisfy the mutation rate and
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unpredictability constraints. Secondly, they lack to use both IP address and
ports shuffling so that the services are vulnerable since they are long-time
exposure to potential attackers. Thirdly, the existing security metrics are
limited to particular attack scenarios or models, very application-specific, and
lack to capture and measure the effectiveness of the various types of MTD
techniques (e.g., shuffling of IP, ports, or network topology). This thesis aims
to address the aforementioned problems in three primary research goals: (1) to
develop a moving target defense mechanism that continuously and dynamically
changes the virtual IP addresses of a server host in the SDN; (2) to design and
develop a moving target defense mechanism that protects the SDN by shuffling
both hosts’ virtual IP addresses and services’ port numbers in the SDN; and
(3) to develop a set of dynamic security metrics for measuring the effectiveness
of the SDN-based MTD techniques.
To achieve the goal (1), a new MTD approach Flexible Random Virtual
IP Multiplexing, namely FRVM, is proposed, which aims to thwart network
reconnaissance and scanning attacks in software-defined networks. FRVM
enables a host machine to have multiple, random, time-varying, virtual IP
addresses, which are multiplexed to a real IP address of the host. The FRVM
frequently changes all the virtual IP addresses of the host over time; the
multiplexing and de-multiplexing operations of it remaps the virtual IP to
a real IP, and a real IP to the virtual IP address(s) of the host respectively.
Therefore, at the end of every multiplexing event, the FRVM aims to make
the attackers lose any knowledge gained through the reconnaissance and to
disturb their scanning strategy. The performance evaluation of the FRVM is
comparatively analyzed with a baseline model (i.e., a typical static network
without FRVM mechanism) through simulations and experiments using the
security (e.g., attacker success probability) and performance metrics (e.g.,
delay, throughput). The results show that the proposed FRVM effectively
increases the attacker’s work effort with acceptable operational overhead.
To achieve the goal (2), a new proactive, dynamic SDN-based MTD
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mechanism Random Host and Service Multiplexing, namely RHSM, is
developed. RHSM uses the multiplexing or de-multiplexing of both IP
addresses (e.g., hosts) and port numbers (e.g., services) aiming to obfuscate
both network and transport layers’ real identities of the hosts and the services
for defending against the network reconnaissance and scanning attacks. RHSM
allows each host to use random, multiple virtual IP addresses to be dynamically
and periodically shuffled. Also, it uses short-lived, multiple virtual port
numbers for active services running on the host. The RHSM dynamically and
frequently changes all the virtual IPs and the virtual ports of the host and
services, respectively. The simulations and experimental results demonstrate
the RHSM effectively outperform a baseline counterpart in terms of the attack
success probability and defense cost.
To achieve the goal (3), new dynamic security metrics are developed. The
proposed dynamic security metrics that timely, dynamically, and adaptively
assess the effectiveness of the SDN-based MTD techniques. The security
metrics are developed to measure the dynamics of a network and a host state’s
information (e.g., IP address, port, software stacks, vulnerabilities, or network
topology) introduced by various types of MTD techniques shuffling them. The
key aspect of our proposed metrics is to capture variability that keeps track
of changing patterns of the network and the host states upon every MTD
triggering event. The proposed metrics are following three categories: (i)
Network and host address-based metrics that measure variability of the network
and the host addresses based on a degree of uncertainty and unpredictability
on the assigned IP address to the hosts in a network; (ii) Attack path-based
metrics which are used to measuring variability of attack paths using graphical
models estimated based on the network state transitions from one topology
to another topology upon triggering a network topology and/or IP shuffling
MTD; and (iii) attack stage-based success metrics measure the chances of
discovering a vulnerable target host’s information, exploiting the target host’s
vulnerability, and compromising the target host. Via extensive simulation
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study, the key parameters that can significantly affect the performance of the
MTD are investigated using the proposed security metrics.
In summary, the main contributions of this thesis are: (1) the development
of the flexible random virtual IP multiplexing (FRVM) in the SDNs; (2) the
evaluation of the security performance and overhead of the MTD in the SDNs;
(3) the development of the random host and service multiplexing (RHSM) for
MTD in the SDNs; and (4) the development of the dynamic security metrics
for measuring effectiveness of the MTDs in the SDNs.
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Conventional networked systems have been characterized by static system
configurations, which can significantly provide benefits to attackers in terms
of their resource utilization in time and effort. The attackers often enjoy
asymmetric advantages because they can take enough time to investigate
a target system by collecting their configuration information to identify
exploitable vulnerabilities. Based on the obtained intelligence towards the
system configuration, the attackers can plan to launch their attacks in order to
maximize their utility and success.
Moving Target Defense (MTD) is a security defense mechanism that
dynamically changes attack surfaces of a target system in order to increase
uncertainty and confuse the attackers, resulting in invalidating the attacker’s
intelligence or information collected during its attack reconnaissance (e.g., hosts
and services scanning attacks) or procedures to launch targeted attacks. Unlike
the concept of the conventional security mechanisms aiming to eliminate any
security vulnerabilities from a system, MTD can work with legacy resources by
changing the system configurations (e.g., IP/port addresses, software stacks,
OS, virtual machines, network topology) that can be used as an effective
cybersecurity defense mechanisms [62, 74, 81].
15
Chapter 1. Introduction
Randomization of network and/or system’s configurations (e.g., IP, ports,
route etc.) has been researched as MTD approaches to thwart reconnaissance
and scanning attacks [74, 99]. This randomization approach has been often
applied at different levels of the network and/or system to change their
properties [119]. For instance, instruction set randomization [83], address
space layout randomization [137], IP address randomization or random host
mutation [3], and random route mutation [44] are common MTD approaches
based on the randomization. Therefore, randomness is a key characteristic of
MTD mechanisms to ensure their effectiveness as it provides unpredictability,
which is an important goal of the MTD mechanisms. A high degree of
unpredictability can make harder for attacker to predict the next state of
the network and/or system’s configurations, which increases attack effort and
reduces the attack success. Most of MTD mechanisms have this randomness
feature, where the defender chooses a next sequence of the configurations
pseudorandomly to make them unpredictable [22]. The degree of randomness
or unpredictability can be increased by using advanced and cryptographically
secure algorithms.
The conventional networked systems are composed of heterogeneous
elements such as switches, firewalls, and routers with their proprietary software
and protocols. This kind of network setup has very little flexibility and
scope for innovations and researches in the networks. Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) has emerged as a solution for resolving this problem of these
existing networks [136]. The SDN architecture decouples the network control
and forwarding functions enabling the network control to become directly
programmable and underline infrastructure to be abstracted for applications
and network services [88]. These flexibility and programmability features
of the SDN technology can be applied to several cybersecurity applications,
including MTD techniques. For instance, the SDN controller (e.g., Ryu [133],
OpenDaylight [108]) can enable a switch to rewrite the packet headers and steer
the traffic towards a specific host by merely updating the forwarding table of
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the switch via an OpenFlow protocol [107]. This flexibility of the network
programming (e.g., packet header modification, dynamic address management,
rerouting) provided by the SDN technology can facilitate the implementation
of the MTD operations for cybersecurity. Also, leveraging the SDN technology
can help to reduce both capital expenditures (CAPEX), and operational
expenditures (OPEX) costs [82]. Flexible placement of the network functions,
fine-grain network traffic optimization, orchestration of network resources, and
automation of the ongoing operational and maintenance tasks all provide an
intuitive indication of potential reduction of the costs [61, 82].
MTD research in SDN-based environments is in an infant stage since both
MTD and SDN research areas have been emerging relatively recently due
to their respective technological advantages (e.g., proactive, dynamic, and
adaptable nature of MTD, and flexibility and programmability features of
SDN). Enhancement of current SDN-based MTD research and/or development
of novel MTD mechanism would be surely a valuable addition to the current
security researches; and development of novel security metrics, particularly
capturing dynamic networks and/or systems and attack behaviors, is a novel
research direction in which most existing security metrics mainly focus on
measuring static aspects of networks and/or systems.
1.2 Problem Statement
The homogeneous and statically configured networked systems provide
asymmetric advantages to attackers, which make them easier for performing
reconnaissance and/or launching their attacks. Also, the attackers have enough
time to investigate the target systems and plan the attacks. The security
attacks cause tremendous socio-economic impact and losses, therefore, it is a
crucial need to not only respond to the attacks but prevent them in advance.
MTD mechanism creates an asymmetric uncertainty to the attackers by
continuously changing the attack surface, which aims to increases uncertainty
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and complexity, to decrease opportunities for identifying the targets, and
to introduce higher cost in launching the attacks [64, 114]. The MTD
mechanism acts as an intrusion prevention mechanism, which reduces the
risk of potential intrusions to the system by changing the attack surface and
minimizing the potential of the attackers in discovering the vulnerable network
or system components, and their attempts to penetrate into the system.
Unlike, conventional security mechanism that aims to keep the system in a
perfect secure by detecting and eliminating any security vulnerabilities from the
system, MTD mechanism disrupts attacker by continuously and dynamically
changing the network or system configurations [77, 74].
The dynamic defense mechanisms based on MTD involve randomizing
network or system components (e.g., IP address, TCP/UDP ports, network
topology, VM, software) to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. The
MTDs can be categorized into the five different domains (e.g., data, software,
run-time environment, platform, and network) according to their place within
the execution stack [118]. Network address shuffling is one of network-based
MTD mechanisms that dynamically change an IP address or a port number
of a host or service of a target system [21]. IP address shuffling (e.g.,
[3, 73, 10, 74, 75, 157, 99]) and port hopping (e.g., [93, 143, 100]) are widely used
MTD mechanisms based on IP addresses and/or ports shuffling. These defense
mechanisms change the IP or virtual IP address or port numbers of the target
system at a certain fixed time interval (e.g., in every 30s). However, there are
problems in network address shuffling MTD mechanisms. First, these MTD
mechanisms randomly mutate or shuffle IP addresses of hosts, mapping them
to virtual IP addresses in a one-to-one manner. One-to-one mapping requires
more IP addresses to satisfy the mutation rate constraint and unpredictability
for the hosts in the network [74], which often results in a lack of scalability
due to a limited address space. Therefore, it needs to develop new IP address
shuffling MTD approaches for flexible mapping and shuffling the virtual IP
addresses of the server machines of the SDN in effectively and efficiently.
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Secondly, in a conventional network, a server machine of the network
commonly provides services using well-known TCP/UDP ports, which remain
unchanged during the service life. The services are vulnerable and long-time
exposure to potential attackers. There are many IP and/or port address
shuffling-based MTD approaches (e.g., [157, 99, 93, 143, 100, 3, 73, 10, 74, 75])
have been proposed to address aforementioned problem. However, the proposed
approaches lack to use of both IP addresses and ports into a single security
defense mechanism. With the shuffling of both IP address and ports able to
hide real services and host’s identities, which can create an extremely diverse
environment and makes more difficult to attackers for discovering vulnerable
hosts and services. Also, the address mapping of the approaches is 1-to-
1 manner, and they often deployed in conventional networks. Hence, it is
important to propose new proactive MTD mechanisms for shuffling both IP
addresses and ports of the hosts in the SDNs.
Thirdly, many security assessment models and metrics have been proposed
for measuring the effectiveness of the MTD techniques [166, 166, 150, 164].
Hong and Kim [64] proposed metrics, such as system risk, attack cost, and
reliability for assessing the effectiveness of MTD categorizing into three different
classes, shuffling, diversity, and redundancy, respectively. Similarly, Hong
et al. [66] proposed attack and defense effort-based metrics for assessing the
effectiveness of the MTD techniques. However, the proposed metrics do not
offer the ability to capture and measure the effectiveness of the network
address shuffling-based MTD techniques. Besides, the existing metrics are
very application-specific, limited to particular attack scenarios and models, and
lack to capture and measure the effectiveness of the various types of MTDs.
Therefore, it is necessary to design a new set of dynamic security metrics that




1.3 Research Questions and Goals
This thesis takes the development of MTD mechanisms and dynamic
security metrics approach to answer the following research questions:
• Q1: How can we shuffle virtual IP addresses of server hosts in the SDN?
• Q2: How can we protect the SDN with the existence of the vulnerable
services on the server systems in the SDN?
• Q3: How can we measure the effectiveness of moving target defenses in
the SDN?
The goals of this thesis are to advance the development and evaluation
of moving target defenses for the software-defined networks. Three goals
corresponding to the research questions are described as follows:
• G1: To develop a new moving target defense mechanism that continuously
and dynamically changes the virtual IP addresses of a server host in
the SDNs. The outcome of this goal includes a new proactive SDN-
based MTD mechanism that enables the server host to have multiple,
random, time-varying virtual IP addresses which are changed frequently
with a specified time interval in order to increase attacker’s work effort
invalidating target system’s information collected by the attacker through
network scanning.
• G2: To design and develop a moving target defense mechanism that
protects the SDN by shuffling both hosts’ virtual IP addresses and services’
port numbers in the SDN. The outcome of this goal consists of a new
dynamic and proactive SDN-based MTD approach using the shuffling
of virtual IP addresses and port numbers aiming to obfuscate both
network and transport layers’ real identities of target server host and




• G3: To develop a set of dynamic security metrics for measuring the
effectiveness of the SDN-based MTD techniques. The outcomes of this
goal include a new suite of dynamic security metrics to capture and
measure the dynamics of a network and/or a host security information
(e.g., IP addresses, port numbers, software stacks, vulnerabilities,
network topology etc.) introduced by various types of MTD techniques
deploying in the SDNs.
1.4 Methodology
We define a methodology with five phases to answer the proposed research
questions systematically. Five phases of the methodology are described below:
System Model: An SDN-based enterprise network is used as the
system model that comprises an SDN-controller (e.g., Ryu [133]), SDN-
switches (e.g., Open vSwitch [125]), end-hosts (e.g., server-hosts, client-hosts),
firewalls/routers etc.. The SDN controller implements the proposed defense
mechanism (e.g., MTD) and controls data forwarding and routing operations of
the network elements using an Openflow-protocol [107] in a centralized manner.
It is assumed that networked systems’ configurations (e.g., IP addresses, ports,
vulnerabilities, topology, route) are changed dynamically by the deployed
defense mechanism in every interval time (e.g., MTD interval time). The
changes in the configuration’s information are captured at different points of
time and used as input to the metrics calculations.
Attacker Model: We define the attacker model to describe how the
attacker interacts with the system model and what types of the attacker and
attacks are considered. We make the assumptions for the attacker’s goals and
capabilities, knowledge of the target systems and attack tools used, attack
strategies, and potential attacks. In this thesis, we assume that the attacker
is located outside the system and attempts to enter into the system with
entry points, targets, and goals stages. The potential attack scenarios are
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considered and modeled with various attack stages (e.g., discover, exploit, and
compromise) for the different attack strategies of the attacker.
Defense Model: We develop the defense model, which consists of the
proactive and dynamic defense approaches to protect the security of the
network based on the SDN. These defense mechanisms are designed and
developed to solve the research questions which can be used to change attack
surface dynamically over time. They validated by comparing them with a
baseline model based on the predefined system and attacker models. The
baseline model is a typical static network where the configuration of the network
remains unchanged.
Metrics & Measurements: A suite of dynamic security metrics are
developed to measure the effectiveness of the MTD mechanisms deployed in
the SDN-based network environments. These metrics capture the dynamics of
the network system made by the deploying MTD mechanism using graphical
security models at different points of time. The metrics use system model,
attacker model, and defense model as input. The metrics are computed based
on the network reachability and host’s vulnerability information of the system
model over time. The attacker and defense models specify the capabilities and
goals of the attacker and the deployed defense mechanisms (e.g., MTD) in the
system model, respectively.
Evaluations: We evaluate the proposed approaches via probabilistic
analysis and simulations methods to validate their feasibility and performance.
In a probabilistic analysis model, the behaviors of the system model, the
attacker model, and the defense model and the interactions between them are
described based on probabilistic parameters and evaluated. The evaluation of
probabilistic models provides insights and lessons based on the observations
of general system behaviors with minimum evaluation cost. The simulation
methods evaluate and validate the performance of the proposed approaches
based on simulation experiments. The simulation scenarios and experiments
are considered based on the system model, the attacker model, and the defense
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model. Emulation models can provide a higher validity since it provides
flexibility in modeling realistic attack types, networked systems, and MTD
techniques.
1.5 Research Contributions
Four main contributions are proposed to moving target defenses in software-
defined networks, which are as follows.
1. Development of Flexible Random Virtual IP Multiplexing
in SDNs: We propose a flexible, dynamic, proactive software-
defined networking (SDN)-based MTD technique called Flexible Random
Virtual IP Multiplexing, namely FRVM, which aims to thwart network
reconnaissance and scanning attacks (i.e., it has been published in [139]).
FRVM enables a host machine to have multiple, random, time-varying,
virtual IP addresses, which are multiplexed to a real IP address of
the host. FRVM frequently changes all the virtual IP addresses of a
specified time interval; the multiplexing and de-multiplexing operations
of it remaps the virtual IP to a real IP, and a real IP to the virtual
IP address(s) of the host respectively. Therefore, at the end of every
multiplexing event, the FRVM aims to make the attackers lose any
knowledge gained through the reconnaissance and to disturb their
scanning strategy. Since identifying IP addresses in a target domain is
a precursory step for most attacks, FRVM can be used to prevent the
attackers from scanning strategy.
2. Security performance and overhead evaluation of the MTD
in SDNs: We comparatively analyze and evaluate the performance
of the SDN-based MTD (e.g., FRVM) with a baseline model (i.e., a
typical static network without FRVM) through the virtualized testbed
using Mininet [91] and simulation experiments using the security and
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performance metrics. We investigated the performance of the FRVM in
terms of attacker success probability under scanning attacks and defense
costs, considering the end-to-end delay and throughput overheads. Also,
we analyze the flow management requirements of the FRVM to deploy in
the SDN-based network environments.
3. Development of Random Host and Service Multiplexing in
SDNs: We propose Random Host and Service Multiplexing (RHSM)
as a novel MTD technique to be deployed in an SDN environment to
defend against network reconnaissance and scanning attacks with the
aim of effectively minimizing attack success probability (ASP) under the
various levels of the scanning attacks and server-host vulnerabilities which
has been published in [140]. Also, we investigate overhead derived from
operating RHSM in terms of the size of the flow table, the frequency
of flow rules modifications, and the performance of an SDN controller.
We develop an SDN-based architecture, algorithms, and communication
protocols that enable the more effective realization of the proposed RHSM
on the testbed. To validate the performance of RHSM, we compare
RHSM with a baseline model with a static network configuration in terms
of the ASP. We analyzed the effect of port address space scanned by
attackers under varying the number of service vulnerabilities. Our results
proved that the proposed RHSM could effectively thwart scanning attacks
and provide a proactive and resilient security solution by effectively hiding
the real identities of both a server-host and its active services in an SDN
environment.
4. Development of Dynamic Security Metrics for measuring the
effectiveness of the MTDs in SDNs: We propose a suite of dynamic
security metrics that timely, dynamically, and adaptively assess the
effectiveness of the software-defined network (SDN)-based moving target
defense (MTD) techniques. The security metrics are developed to
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measure the dynamics of a network and a host state’s information (e.g.,
IP address, port, software stacks, vulnerabilities, or network topology)
introduced by various types of MTD techniques shuffling them. The key
aspect of our proposed metrics is to capture variability that keeps track
of changing patterns of the network and the host states upon every MTD
triggering event. In this work, we propose the following security metrics
capturing the variability based on the changes made by the MTD:
• Network and host address-based metrics measure the variability of
the network and the host addresses based on a degree of uncertainty
and unpredictability on the assigned IP address to the hosts in a
network;
• Attack path-based metrics compute variability of attack paths using
graphical models estimated based on the network state transitions
from one topology to another topology upon triggering a network
topology or IP shuffling MTD; and
• Attack stage-based success metrics measure the chances of
discovering a vulnerable target host’s information, exploiting the
target host’s vulnerability, and compromising the target host.
Besides, we investigated the key parameters that can significantly affect
the MTD performance based on the proposed dynamic security metrics.
1.6 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discuses state-
of-the-art MTD researches, including key concepts, classifications, attacks
modeling, and metrics used in MTD. Chapter 3 presents the description
of the proposed Flexible Random Virtual IP Multiplexing (FRVM) defense
mechanism and evaluation of the FRVM via simulation experiments in a
virtualized network environment using Mininet [91] emulator (addressing
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the research goal G1). Chapter 4 proposes the Random Host and Service
Multiplexing (RHSM) mechanism for MTD in SDNs (addressing the research
goal G2). Chapter 5 describes the dynamic security metrics for measuring the
effectiveness of the MTD techniques in SDNs (addressing the research goal G3).
Chapter 6 discusses the usability and limitations of the thesis and highlights the




This chapter discusses the related work on state-of-the-art MTDs, including
MTD concepts, classifications of MTD, attacks modeling in MTD, and metrics
used for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of the MTD mechanisms.
Section 2.1 presents the MTD concepts, including the evolution of MTD, key
roles and design principles of MTD, defensive deceptions, and the existing SDN-
based MTD approaches. Section 2.2 describes the classifications of the MTD
techniques, Section 2.3 discusses the attacks considered in the MTD techniques
and the existing MTD metrics are presented in Section 2.4.
2.1 MTD Concepts
In this section, we provide backgrounds and key design principles of MTD.
We discuss the two major roles of the MTD in terms of the intrusion prevention
mechanism and the detection of potential attackers. Also, we clarified the
design principles of the MTD with three key questions and summarized the
benefits and caveats of applying the MTD techniques.
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2.1.1 Evolution of MTD
In the classic “shell game,” dating at least to the times of ancient Greece,
a pea or ball is hidden under one of three shells or cups, and players gamble to
guess the location of the pea after the shells have been moved. This game is also
known as “thimblerig,” “three shells and a pea,” and the “old army game” and
has variant forms, such as “Three-card Monte.” The advantage for the operator
of the game is that sufficient movement of the shells will confuse the players of
the location of the pea. This underlying idea exemplifies the philosophy of the
so-called “Moving Target Defense (MTD)” strategy in cybersecurity [114].
The basic axiom of MTD is that it is impossible to provide complete and
perfect security for a given system. Given this, the objective is to enable
the normal functioning of the system (i.e., the normal provision of services)
even in the presence of malicious actors seeking to compromise the system.
Since attacks cannot be prevented, the goal is to defend against and thwart
attacks. In practice, this goal is achieved via MTD by the manipulation of
multiple system configurations to modify and control the attack surface, where
the attacker engages with the system. MTD aims to increase uncertainty and
complexity for any attacker of the system, to decrease the opportunities for
the attacker to identify targets (e.g., vulnerable system components), and
to introduce higher cost in launching attacks or scans (e.g., reconnaissance
attacks). The desired result is that the attacker will waste time and effort
without gaining useful intelligence about system [64, 114].
Origins of the conception of MTD can be found under different names in
the computer security literature. Some of these research areas include fault
tolerance (or reliability using redundancy) even since the 1970’s (e.g., n-version
programming (NVP) [12, 27]), reconfigurable computing (e.g., reconfigurable
software [34], network reconfiguration [15]), and/or bio-inspired cybersecurity
(e.g., software and/or network diversity for cybersecurity [87, 90]). In 2009, the
Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD)
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Program explicitly emphasized the concept of MTD in terms of its effectiveness
and efficiency, which can leverage existing resources [57].
2.1.2 Key Roles of MTD
MTD can contribute to enhancing the security provided by an intrusion
defense system (IDS) in two ways. First, MTD acts as an intrusion
prevention mechanism by reducing the risk of potential intrusions to the system.
Many MTD techniques, including Internet Protocol (IP) and/or TCP ports
randomization and/or mutation, network re-configurations, topology and/or
route changing, platform diversity (e.g., OS, VM migration etc.), and software
stack shuffling etc. changes the attack surface, thereby minimizing the potential
of attackers in their discovery of vulnerable system components and in their
attempts to penetrate into the target system.
Second, MTD can assist in the detection of potential attackers. Since
the MTD techniques can increase the complexity of an attack operation
to identify a target, the intelligence about attack patterns or behaviors of
potential attackers can be easily obtained by monitoring active activities
(e.g., scanning) by the potential attackers. This allows MTD techniques,
categorized as intrusion protection mechanisms, to also indirectly assist an
intrusion detection system in improving the detection of potential attacks. As
Table 2.1 describes, compared to the characteristics of the conventional security
techniques, MTD aims to provide affordable, service-oriented defense in terms
of minimizing defense cost (e.g., communication or computation overhead),
maximizing service availability to users, and meeting a required level of security.
In particular, the underlying idea of MTD lies in ‘affordable defense’ because it
focuses on rearranging system configurations to confuse attackers while still
employing existing security mechanisms. This means that MTD does not
require the development of new security mechanisms, which often need to
goadopt through tough, high-standard security analysis and accordingly may
require an excessive amount of time or effort. Therefore, MTD provides a
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Philosophy Building a secure system by
covering all vulnerabilities is
the key for security
It is impossible to build a perfectly
secure system
Goal Make a system perfectly
secure








Dynamic defense using dynamic




How to identify all potential
system security vulnerabilities
and eliminate them
How to optimally execute MTD
operations to continuously change
attack surface while meeting multiple
system objectives concerning security
and performance
Challenges Due to limited capability to
detect all exhaustive, possible
vulnerabilities and their high
complexity, and it is
unfeasible to identify all
possible vulnerabilities
Optimally executing MTD operations
is not a trivial task because frequently
executing MTD operations are costly
and often hurts service availability to
users
new way of defense that continues to leverage legacy resources but enhances
security by dynamically changing the attack surface, such as any aspects of
system components (e.g., data, software, platforms, run-time environments,
networks) to increase uncertainty and confusion for the attackers.
2.1.3 Key Design Principles of MTD
MTD was introduced as a proactive defense mechanism to prevent
cyberattacks continuously and dynamically changing the attack surface of
systems [57]. The fundamental design principle for developing the MTD
techniques lies in the decisions for the following three key questions [22]: what
to move, how to move, and when to move.
What to move: ‘How to move’ refers to what system configuration
attribute (i.e., attack surface) can be dynamically changed to confuse attackers.
The example system or network attributes that can be changed include
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instruction sets [83, 127], address space layouts [137], IP addresses [3, 10,
73, 85], port numbers [99], proxies [79], virtual machines [170, 18], operating
systems [151], or software programs [71]. A change in the system configuration
attributes must cause a change on the attack surface of the system leading
to the loss of work and increased complexity for attackers. Additionally, the
number of possible values the dynamic attribute can change to must be vast,
thwarting the attacker’s ability to simply brute-force the future value [22].
How to move: ‘How to move’ defines how to change the moving
attributes (i.e., targets) to increase unpredictability or uncertainty, leading
to an attacker’s high confusion. This is related to the three operation-based
MTD classification components: shuffling, diversity, and redundancy (SDR).
Common MTD techniques include artificial diversity [18, 68, 71, 132, 154] or
randomization [3, 10, 73, 79, 83, 85, 99, 103, 137, 144, 158], which rearrange
or randomize the various system and network attributes where each work
can belong to shuffling, diversity, and/or redundancy techniques. Fig. 2.1
depicts examples of how to move the moving elements using MTD based on
the shuffling, diversity and redundancy classification [4, 64].
Figure 2.1: Examples of the three MTD techniques: shuffling, diversity, and
redundancy.
When to move: ‘When to move’ involves deciding the optimal time to
change from the current state of an MTD system to a new state, invalidating
information or progress gained by an attacker in the current state. The three
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common types of movement (or adaptation) are reactive, proactive, or hybrid
strategies.
• Reactive movement: The reactive movement is based on an event or
an alert that executes the adaptation as a response to a message from
the detection of suspicious activity. Reactive MTD attempts to counter
actions taken by an attacker under the assumption that the attacker’s
actions are detected.
• Proactive movement: The proactive movement triggers MTD
techniques by changing configurations or properties on a schedule, with
either fixed or random intervals between adaptations. The proactive
movement ensures that any information gained by the attacker quickly
expires [103], thus regular movement is important. Proactive MTD moves
regardless of the presence of an attacker costing additional delay in the
protected system.
• Hybrid movement: The hybrid movement is based on both reactive and
proactive features, wherein the time interval to trigger an MTD operation
is adaptive upon certain events or security alerts while the interval is also
bounded in length to prevent potential, undetected security threats [175].
Figure 2.2: An example of the MTD move with proactive and reactive MTD
movement.
Fig. 2.2 shows an example of ‘when to move’ which addresses at what time
point the element(s) of MTD can be moved under hybrid movement [4, 64]. In
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Fig. 2.2, a blue line means an MTD can be triggered at a fixed MTD interval,
whereas an orange line shows an MTD triggered by an event (e.g., an intrusion
detection alert). Intuitively, we can notice that using the fixed MTD interval is
more proactive than using the adaptive MTD interval in confusing attackers.
However, the high frequency of MTD operations may incur high costs. Hence,
an optimal MTD interval can be identified at run-time to balance both cost and
security. A running system can have different moving elements (e.g., IP, Port,
OS, VM, Applications) over the time, and their changes can take place either
at a regular fixed interval of time or upon receiving an intrusion detection alert.
2.1.4 Defensive Deceptions
In military settings, deception is originally derived from actions to be
executed to intentionally mislead an opponent’s decision associated with the
strengths and weakness of military capacities, intents, or operations. Defensive
deception is created to affect an attacker’s action in a way a defender wants
to achieve its mission [141]. Deception has been studied based on many
classifications. Bell and Whaley [17] and Almeshekah and Spafford [8] discuss
deception techniques in terms of either ‘hiding the real’ or ‘showing the
false.’ That is, the defender can modify the information or present misleading
information to the attacker. For example, the defender can mislead the
attackers to misjudge by providing a false sense that the attacker has complete,
certain, relevant information for its decision making, which is not true indeed.
Caddell [20] classifies deception in terms of ‘passive deception’ and ‘active
deception.’ The passive deception includes actions to hide capabilities or
intents from the attacker. The active deception involves leading the attacker
to form false beliefs by providing false information. Daniel and Herbig [42]
introduces two types of deception techniques based on their goals, aiming
to increase an attacker’s perceived ambiguity and to mislead the attacker to
misjudge. Rahman et al. [129] proposed a game-theoretic approach using
the Nash equilibrium strategy as a deception technique to prevent remote
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OS fingerprinting attacks. They showed that the designed technique named
DeceiveGame could significantly decrease the fingerprinting attack success
probability while the overall usability of the system is preserved without
performance degradation. Bell and Whaley [17] and Almeshekah and Spafford
[8] show some other example deception techniques that dissimulate information
in order to hide real information and simulate information to make the attacker
form false beliefs. Examples of dissimulation deception are masking (i.e., hiding
the real), repackaging (i.e., creating the false), and dazzling (i.e., confusing an
attacker) [8, 17].
MTD and deception, both defense approaches have the same goal to confuse
attackers by increasing their uncertainty in the decision process of launching
attacks. Hence, the deception techniques used for increasing confusion can also
belong to the MTD. Also, even if the deception techniques are used to mislead
attackers, but they are also being dynamically deployed (i.e., a different set of
decoy nodes is deployed at a different time [54]), they can be treated as MTD
techniques.
Although these two defense techniques are common in their goal, deception
takes a more aggressive strategy than MTD in terms of intentionally presenting
false information for the attacker to form false beliefs while MTD does not use
a strategy of lying or disseminating false information to mislead attackers.
However, these two defense mechanisms can work together well to benefit each
other in the following sense. Deploying deception can be less costly than MTD
operations and can help MTD to save its cost because the attack can be delayed
if an attacker is successfully deceived by the deployed defensive deception and
accordingly, MTD does not have to be triggered as often as the system without
deception [29]. Besides, the defense strength achievable by defensive deception
is limited in nature because the deception can be ultimately known to the
attacker sometime later. When the attacker found it was deceived by the
defensive deception, the system can trigger an MTD operation to protect the
system without a security breach.
34
Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1.5 SDN-based MTD Approaches
Software-defined networking has emerged as a promising technology
to decouple the network control plane from the data-forwarding plane
for providing flexibility, robustness, and programmability to a networked
system [136]. In conventional networks, a routing algorithm in each switch
makes packet forwarding decisions. By contrast, a controller on an SDN is
designed to control the forwarding operations of the switches in a centralized
manner. Various cybersecurity network applications have leveraged the
flexibility and programmability of SDN technology. In this section, we
discuss the existing MTD techniques, attacks, methodologies, and evaluation
methods used to develop MTD technologies to protect SDN-based network
environments.
IP shuffling / mutation-based MTD is popularly used in SDN environments
by leveraging OF switches and a centralized SDN controller [74, 73, 103]
where the SDN controller makes packet-forwarding decisions at each OF switch
and decisions on the updates of the flow tables at the switch. Network
topology shuffling is also a well-known MTD technique [1, 13] that has been
applied in SDN environments in order to minimize security vulnerabilities
in attack paths [64] by the SDN controller identifying an optimal network
reconfiguration. The scalability issue in SDN environments is also managed
by the SDN controller, which creates scalable attack graphs [30]. An
SDN-based packet header randomization is proposed to realize unlinkability
anonymity in communications where the SDN controller and OF switches
take care of routing based on nonce information [144, 158]. The common
attacks considered in SDN-based MTD approaches include reconnaissance (or
scanning) attacks [30, 63, 64, 74, 73, 81] and DDoS attacks [13, 147], which can
be countermeasured by using random IP mutation and/or network topology
shuffling.
The key idea of deploying MTD techniques in SDN environments is to
35
Chapter 2. Literature Review
highly leverage its centralized structure with an SDN controller to optimize
the configuration of the deployed MTD techniques, such as IP randomization
/ shuffling [74, 73, 103, 147], network routing paths [65], attack graphs /
paths [30], port hopping [81], packet header randomization / obfuscation [144,
158], or virtual topology generation [2]. The key concerns in developing SDN-
based MTD approaches are resolving a scalability issue in an attack graph [30]
or IP shuffling [103] and optimizing both security and performance in terms of
minimizing security vulnerabilities while minimizing defense cost and service
interruptions to users. Simulation-based validation methods are popular, but
some emulation-based testbeds are also developed for validating SDN-based
MTD (e.g., a Mininet emulator with NOX SDN controller [73]). Hong et al.
[65] conducted security and performance analysis of their proposed network
topology shuffling-based MTD in a real SDN testbed consisting of SDN-enabled
hardware switches and an SDN controller. Kampanakis et al. [81] showed the
performance of the proposed SDN-based port hopping MTD based on Cisco’s
One Platform Kit.
2.1.6 Discussions on Benefits and Caveats of MTD
In this section, we discuss the key benefits of MTD and caveats in developing
MTD techniques concerning the roles and design principles of MTD techniques.
The key benefits of MTD techniques include as follows:
• Providing affordable defense opportunities. Compared to conventional
security mechanisms aiming to perfectly eliminate any vulnerabilities
and risks that can be introduced by attackers, MTD provides a new
perspective of a defense system by continuously changing the attack
surface, which makes it harder for attackers to achieve their goals. MTD
allows us to leverage legacy system components and existing technologies,
enabling a greater likelihood of achieving affordable defense solutions
and avoiding the necessity of creating a new, highly robust security
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mechanism, such as cryptographic solutions, which requires more resource
/ time to develop but may be less applicable in broad contexts (e.g., under
the assumption of trusted entities for key management).
• Providing another layer of defense in cooperation with existing defense
mechanisms. At the same time, MTD can cooperate with other
defense mechanisms by assisting in intrusion detection that can thwart
potential attackers and/or provide new attack patterns observed during
the reconnaissance stage of the attack. Also, MTD can add another layer
of defense when a defensive deception is used to deceive an attacker. In
particular, when the attacker realized the deception and can successfully
identify vulnerable system component, not being lured by the deception
(e.g., a honeypot), MTD can be executed to migrate the system platform
in order to invalidate the information of the system vulnerabilities
collected by the attacker in the current system configuration.
However, we also need to be aware of the following caveats in developing
MTD techniques:
• High frequency of triggering MTD operation may significantly hinder
seamless, quality service provision to users. This issue is related to a
design principle related to ‘when to move’ a target because triggering
MTD operations too often naturally leads to reducing service availability
and/or interrupting seamless service provision.
• Non-adaptive, non-intelligent MTD may waste defense cost while not
decreasing system vulnerabilities. In some system/network settings,
resources are highly constrained, such as IoT environments or mobile,
wireless networks. The strategy in deciding how to expend defense
resources is critical to prolonging system lifetime and increase system
reliability (or survivability). If a deployed MTD is not adaptively and/or
intelligently executed based on a level of detected security vulnerabilities,
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then the required system goals, such as minimizing defense cost and
maintaining a certain level of system security, may not be met.
• How to execute MTD operations in resource-constrained, distributed
network environments has not been sufficiently studied in the literature.
Most existing MTD approaches consider a trusted third party for network
management associated with running an MTD technique. However, in
some decentralized or distributed, resource-constrained environments,
such as mobile ad hoc networks, wireless sensor networks, or IoT
networks, it is not easy to identify a trusted infrastructure that can make
critical decisions on MTD executions. Further, the cost of executing
MTD operations should be considered as a priority as those contested
environments can only afford highly lightweight MTD solutions.
2.2 Classifications of MTD
MTD techniques have been studied under various classifications with
different criteria. In this section, we discuss how the MTD techniques have
been classified in the literature. Also, we distinguish the concepts of MTD
from those of deception and discuss what the commonalities and differences
are between them.
2.2.1 Timeliness-based MTD
Timeliness-based MTD classifies MTD techniques based on criteria to
determine the MTD strategy ‘when to move.’ Fig. 2.3 depicts the three common
timeliness-based MTD categories as follows:
2.2.1.1 Time-based MTD
This approach triggers an MTD operation based on a certain time interval
called the MTD interval, which can be a fixed interval or a variable interval [22].
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Time-based Event-based Hybrid-based
Timeliness-based MTD
Figure 2.3: Classifications of timeliness-based MTD techniques.
With a fixed time interval, the MTD mechanism periodically changes the attack
surface (e.g., IP/Port addresses, OS rotation, VM migration) with a constant
equal time, which remains unchanged. If the interval time is too large, then
an attacker may be allowed a sufficient amount of time to scan a system and
then penetrate the system, resulting in a security breach. On the other hand,
if the interval time is too short, then the MTD triggers even when there is no
attack on the system, wasting defense resources and degrading performance.
Therefore, determining the MTD interval time to perform an MTD operation
has a significant impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of a given MTD
technique [23].
2.2.1.2 Event-based MTD
This approach performs an MTD operation only when a certain event
occurs. The event can encompass any indication an attacker accesses a
system or attempts to launch a certain attack. That is, if the defender can
accurately predict potential attacks, then events can trigger the appropriate
MTD operation. In order to discover the key events that should trigger
the MTD action, attack prediction based adaptive MTD approaches have
been proposed using machine learning [33], game theory [172], and control
theory [132].
2.2.1.3 Hybrid MTD
Some MTD approaches take a hybrid strategy. These approaches [84, 132,
174, 175] execute MTD operations adaptively based on both the time and event-
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based MTD strategies for proactive and reactive adaptations, respectively.
2.2.2 Operation-based MTD
In this section, we study MTD techniques and classify them based on criteria
to determine ‘how to move’ as described in Section 2.1.3. Hong and Kim
[64] classified MTD techniques into three classes based on the nature of their
operations: shuffling, diversity, and redundancy.
2.2.2.1 Shuffling
This technique rearranges or randomizes system configurations, such as
mutating IP addresses at a TCP/IP layer or dynamically adjusting the
migration time of VMs. The key goal of these shuffling-based MTD techniques
is to increase confusion and uncertainty for attackers (i.e., to make the
identification of vulnerable targets more difficult) by making information
collected by the attackers obsolete or by wasting attackers resources in the
collection of useless information. Ultimately, shuffling-based MTD can prevent
or delay the attackers from accessing a target system. Because the system
earns more time to monitor the attack behaviors (e.g., scanning attacks), the
system’s defense mechanisms (e.g., IDS) can prepare more intelligent strategies
to deal with the attack based on identified attacks. In this section, we discuss
various methods which have been used to change the system and/or network
configurations or attack surface.
• IP-Shuffling / Mutations: Many shuffling-based MTD techniques used
IP shuffling or mutation in various network domains. Kewley et al.
[85] proposed an IP hopping method to defend against any adversaries
sniffing the network by translating an IP address before any packet enters
to a public network. It hides the IP address to prevent man-in-the-
middle sniffing attacks. However, it did not concern scanning attacks
relying on probe responses to discover client hosts. Antonatos et al.
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[10] proposed the NASR scheme to deal with hitlist worms. NASR
is a LAN-level network address randomization technique based on the
dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) updates. Although NASR
reflects the nature of shuffling based on the IP address randomization
as an MTD mechanism, it disrupts the active connections and has
limitations in providing high unpredictability and mutation speed due
to constrained address space in terms of a LAN address. Shi et al.
[143] developed an active cyber-defense mechanism based on port and
address hopping with timestamp-based synchronization. However, this
cyber-defense mechanism is developed to deal with denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks only within the scope of metropolitan area networks
(MANs) and multiple LANs. Jafarian et al. [73] proposed an IP address
shuffling technique called open-flow random host mutation (OF-RHM)
that randomly mutates the IP address of the end-hosts. In OF-RHM,
a real IP address of the end-host remains unchanged while associating
with a short-lived virtual IP address, which has been changed randomly
and periodically. Although the OF-RHM is transparent to end-hosts and
provides a high mutation rate, it cannot be deployed in a conventional
network due to low scalability. Al-Shaer et al. [3] proposed random
host mutation (RHM) to address the scalability problem in conventional
networks. RHM uses a two-phase mutation approach with low and
high-frequency mutation intervals for allocating virtual address range
and selecting vIP to the host, respectively. However, this work did not
consider the effectiveness of the RHM against more intelligent attacks
such as advanced persistent threats (APTs). Similarly, Jafarian et al.
[76] presented a spatiotemporal address mutation technique that aims to
mitigate the impact of APTs by varying host IP binding dynamically
based on location and time. In addition, Jafarian et al. [74] investigated
the effectiveness of the address mutation approaches [3] [73]. However,
their effectiveness evaluations are limited to the effects of the scanning
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worm’s attacks. MacFarland and Shue [103] used a host IP address
mutation to defend a large-scale network by employing an SDN controller
that controls DNS interactions. Antonatos et al. [10] proposed an IP
randomization technique to thwart hitlist worms attacks, aiming to
avoid malicious worms that gather information about victim targets in
a networked system and making it hard for attackers to identify new,
vulnerable targets. Jafarian et al. [73] implemented an IP shuffling
technique mutating the IP addresses unpredictably while minimizing the
overhead of the MTD operations. The authors used the SDN-based
OpenFlow (OF) protocol that frequently assigns Virtual IP addresses
translated from and/or to a real host’s IP address.Carroll et al. [23]
also studied network address shuffling to protect honeypots as an MTD
technique based on probability models to quantify the attack success
probability with respect to the size of a network, the number of addresses
scanned by attackers, the number of system vulnerabilities, and the
frequency of triggering the shuffling-based MTD. Kampanakis et al. [81]
employed host randomization and mutation, evaluating the performance
in terms of the attackers’ overhead increased by the MTD technique used
in an SDN platform.
• Port Hopping: Lee and Thing [93] proposed a port hopping technique
for mitigating DoS attacks. It changes a server’s port numbers
dynamically based on time, and a cryptographic key shared between
server and client, which adds overhead for time synchronization and
key management.Shi et al. [143] proposed a port and address hopping
technique for active cyber defense. However, it is a timestamp-
based synchronization hopping of services, and its scope is limited to
metropolitan area networks. Luo et al. [99] proposed a random hopping-
based MTD changing the port numbers and IP addresses. It maps IP and
port in a one-to-one manner; however, it is only applied to conventional
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networks requiring additional overhead to maintain the infrastructures.
Zhang et al. [169] proposed a port hopping technique to mitigate DoS
attacks in SDN. The proposed technique takes a timestamp feedback-
based synchronization approach while requiring extra ports for listening
and receiving the feedback messages, resulting in increasing of the attack
surface. Luo et al. [98] studied a port hopping technique based on the
concept of shuffling-based MTD to effectively deal with reconnaissance
attacks by hiding service identities while increasing confusion for potential
attackers. This work quantifies the effectiveness of the proposed port
hopping technique based on the attack success probability as a function of
the values of key design parameters, including the size of a port pool, the
number of probes, the number of vulnerable services, and the frequency
of port hopping.
• Packet/Frame Header Randomization: Wang et al. [158] proposed a
technique called U-TRI, Unlinkability Through Random Identifier, which
uses the randomization of a packet header identifier to confuse attackers.
Skowyra et al. [144] proposed a packet header randomization (PHEAR)
technique that eliminated implicit and explicit network identifiers from
a packet header. However, PHEAR was designed to be used only within
internal networks, relying on existing security mechanisms (i.e., IKE2 and
IPSec).
• Network Topology Shuffling: The underlying idea of this technique
is to invalidate an attacker’s path information by continuously changing
routes in networks. Achleitner et al. [2, 1] proposed a virtual topology
generation framework against network scanning attacks by leveraging
the SDN technology. Hong et al. [65] presented an optimal network
reconfiguration technique based on the concept of shuffling-based MTD
for SDN environments. They solved a shuffling assignment problem and
showed the increase in network security when network routing paths are
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diversified.
• VM / Proxy Migration: Danev et al. [41] considered securely
migrating Virtual Machines (VMs) as an Msome emulationTD
mechanism in a private cloud. The underlying idea of this work is to
utilize an extra physical Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and trusted
parties for the migration process as well as public key infrastructure to
secure the protocol. Zhang et al. [170] developed a periodic VM migration
as an MTD technique based on the balance between the level of security
obtained and the cost incurred upon the migration of VMs. Penner
and Guirguis [123] developed a set of MTD technologies to change the
location of VMs in a cloud to defend against attacks leveraging a Multi-
Armed Bandit (MAB) policy, which aims to exploit VMs providing the
highest reward. The proposed MTD techniques are deployed to minimize
the MAB attacks launched by the attacker aiming to obtain credentials
(e.g., credit card information) or critical data. The proposed MTD
techniques are evaluated based on how much time it takes to switch VMs.
However, the enhanced security introduced by the MTD techniques has
not been investigated. Jia et al. [79] devised an MTD technique to deal
with Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks through securing data
transmission between authenticated (legitimate) clients and a protected
server. This method used the technique called client-to-proxy shuffling
that continuously moves secret proxies. For evaluation, they assessed the
resistance of their method toward brute-force attacks, as well as proxy-
based and communication-based overhead. Peng et al. [122] proposed VM
migration or snapshotting and diversity or compatibility of migration
for cloud networks. This work considered attackers’ learning based on
accumulated intelligence obtained and dynamics and heterogeneity of a
service’s attack surface. Finally, this work proposed a probability model
to propose an MTD service deployment strategy. This study found that
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the proposed MTD technique is more effective under a dense service
deployment and strong attacks while the defender’s awareness toward the
heterogeneity and dynamics of the attack surface is helpful for enhancing
the effectiveness of the MTD as it can be used to determine when/how
to perform the MTD.
• Software / Service Reconfiguration: Casola et al. [26] developed
an MTD technique based on the reconfiguration of devices in an IoT
environment whose cryptosystems and firmware versions are shuffled.
Vikram et al. [155] proposed a shuffling based MTD technique on the
application layer for a secure web through randomizing HTML elements.
Most bots attacking the web use static HTML elements in the HTTP
content/form page. Hence, the randomization of those HTML elements
and parameters could be an appropriate technique for avoiding web bot
attacks.
• Platform Diversity: Okhravi et al. [116] proposed the Trusted Dynamic
Logical Heterogeneity System (TALENT) framework for live-migrating
of the critical infrastructure applications across heterogeneous platforms,
which permits running of the critical applications to change its hardware
and operating system (OS). It changes a platform on-the-fly, creates
a cyber moving target, and provides the cyber survivability through
platform diversity. TALENT creates a virtualized environment at the
OS-level using containers with a checkpoint compiler for migrating a
running application of different platforms. It preserves the state of the
application, such as the execution state, the open files, and the network
connections during the migration.
• OS-Rotation: Thompson et al. [151] developed the Multiple OS
Rotational Environment (MORE) MTD based on the existing technology
to achieve a feasible MTD solution at an OS-level. MORE MTD consists
of a set of virtual machines (VMs) equipped with a different distribution
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of OS (i.e., different Linux distributions) and web applications. The
periodic rotation of the hosts/VMs creates a dynamic environment
controlled by an administrator’s machine running a daemon process. This
technique reduces the likelihood of successful exploitation of the OS’s
vulnerabilities and its security impact by limiting the duration of the
rotation window. The “rotation window” is the duration of an OS being
exposed and vulnerable to an attack.
Shuffling-based MTD techniques can easily work with existing technologies
without developing another security mechanism that requires a thorough
security analysis. Hence, in terms of the development cost and resources,
these methods are useful, immediately applicable, and highly compatible with
legacy devices and technologies. However, since shuffling relies on the quality
of existing technologies, if those existing technologies are not robust enough
against attacks (i.e., well-known vulnerabilities to attackers), the security
achieved by this shuffling technique can be significantly limited by those
vulnerabilities of the legacy devices/technologies. In this case, the shuffling
frequency can be increased to help cover those vulnerabilities, but this also will
increase the defense cost incurred by over-utilizing MTD as another layer of
defense. Furthermore, the shuffling spaces (e.g., many virtual IPs that can be
assigned for a real IP) are critical to enhancing security.
2.2.2.2 Diversity
This technique employs the deployment of system components with different
implementations that provide the same functionalities. The examples include
the use of diverse paths for routing or the change of platforms consisting of
different implementation of software components or migration between different
platforms (i.e., software stacks or hardware). Diversity-based MTD aims to
enhance system resilience by increasing fault-tolerance in that the system can
provide normal services in the presence of attackers in the system. In this
section, we discuss how system diversity is realized based on a variety of
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domains.
• Software Stack Diversity: Huang and Ghosh [68] and Huang et al.
[69] introduced a diversity MTD technique in order to enhance network
resilience and service provisions. They deployed a diversity method to
the virtual servers (VS) like OSs, virtualization components, web servers,
and application software. They evaluated the proposed diversity method
with respect to attack success probability.
• Code Diversity: Azab et al. [14] developed an MTD technique that
changes a running program’s variants erratically based on the concept of
diversity. The proposed method divides a large program into components
(e.g., cells or tasks) that can be performed by functionally-equivalent
variants. Their method includes a recovery mechanism to enhance the
resilience of the proposed technique. Choosing a different variant at
runtime makes it hard for an attacker to penetrate and scan the system.
The proposed method can mitigate even the effect of the attack success
by affecting one variant that can be instantly replaced by another variant
through the recovery mechanism. However, the robustness against
attacks based on security analysis is not clear, while its implementation
is quite complex, which can be questioned for applicability in diverse
contexts. In automated software diversity, a program can diversify at
instruction, block, loop, program, and system levels in different phases
of the life cycle, such as compilation and linking, or installation [92]. A
JIT (just-in-time) compiler (i.e., Java/Python JIT compilers) generates
code during the execution of the program. The JIT compilers can be
used for the code diversification. In this case, the security of the system
depends on how predictable the JIT compilers are. The code diversity
can be enhanced with adaptive notification-oriented programming (i.e.,
assembly language instruction, no-op) [78].
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• Programming Language Diversity: Taguinod et al. [148] focused on
an MTD technique based on the diversification of programming languages
to avoid code and SQL injection attacks. This work proposed the MTD
technique to be applied in different layers of the web application to change
the implemented language of the web application without affecting or
disrupting the system functionality.
• Network Diversity: Zhuang et al. [174] investigated the relationship
between the diversity of network configurations and attack success
probability by evaluating the MTD technique based on a logical mission
model. The authors examined how the network size, the frequency of
shuffling / adaptations, and the number of vulnerable computers affect
the effectiveness of the MTD technique based on the experimental results
tested from the network security simulator, NeSSi2.
Like shuffling-based MTD techniques, diversity-based MTDs can leverage the
existing technologies. As discussed earlier, diversity-based MTD techniques are
often combined with shuffling-based counterparts to double the effectiveness of
a proposed MTD. However, since the diversity-based MTD is also based on the
existing technologies, if those technologies have high vulnerabilities to attacks,
introducing MTD as another layer of defense does not provide better security,
even with the sacrifice of additional defense costs. Also, the degree of diversity
significantly affects the effectiveness of the MTD. For example, if there are
not many alternatives to use (e.g., only two versions of software that provides
the same functionality with different implementations), there will be inherent
limitations in enhancing security.
2.2.2.3 Redundancy
This technique provides multiple replicas of system (or network)
components, such as multiple paths between nodes in a network layer
or multiple software components providing the same functionality at the
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application layer. The key aim of redundancy-based MTD is to increase
system dependability (e.g., reliability or availability) by providing redundant
ways of providing the same services when some of the network nodes or
system components are compromised. In this sense, redundancy contributes
to increasing system (or network) resilience in the presence of insider threats.
This technique can often be combined with diversity-based MTD so that, for
example, redundant services are available where the attackers are required to
know additional credentials or intelligence to use other alternative components
(e.g., different or additional credentials or a different level of privileges). In this
section, we discuss how these techniques are studied in the existing approaches.
• Redundancy of Software Components: Yuan et al. [165] proposed a
redundancy method for web servers to prevent malicious code injection
attacks on a web server by developing a self-protection model, including
architectural adaptation threat detection and mitigation. They used the
so-called agreement-based redundancy that provides replicas of software
components at runtime. However, this work did not investigate the
effectiveness of the proposed MTD mechanism.
• Redundancy of Network Sessions: Li et al. [95] proposed a
traffic morphing mechanism by adopting the concept of MTD in
terms of redundancy for cyber-physical system (CPS) environments.
The proposed traffic morphing algorithm is designed to protect CPS
sessions by maintaining several redundant network sessions that have the
distributions of inter-packet delays indistinguishable from those observed
in normal network sessions. A CPS message will be disseminated via
one of these sessions to meet its given time constraint. In the process of
dynamically adjusting the morphing process, this work showed the low
complexity of the proposed work and high adaptivity to the dynamics of
CPS sessions.
Unlike shuffling or diversity-based MTDs, redundancy-based MTD has a
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greater bearing on service available to users, which is often measured by some
concept of system dependability (e.g., availability or reliability) in which the
availability (or reliability) can be easily interrupted by performing shuffling or
diversity-based MTD, particularly incurring interrupted services. Note that
redundancy-based MTD can be well-mingled with the other two techniques to
increase both security and performance. However, creating additional replicas
of system components (e.g., servers or paths) incurs an extra cost. Also, if
redundancy-based MTD is not properly executed, it provides an even greater
chance for an attacker to perform attacks on a larger attack surface (i.e.,
another server to attack or another path to reach a target) than the system
without the redundancy-based MTD.
2.2.3 Discussions on MTD Classifications
While the timeliness-based MTD categorizes MTD techniques based on
the principle of ‘when to move,’ the operation-based MTD classifies MTD
techniques by answering ‘how to move.’ In the timeliness-based MTD, when
a defender has high uncertainty about an attacker’s current activities and/or
behaviors, it is better to trigger an MTD operation based on a certain, fixed
time interval. However, after the defender becomes certain about the attack
patterns/activities, it can detect the system’s vulnerabilities more accurately.
And then, the defender can adaptively execute the MTD operation to save
defense costs by using an event-based MTD, for example, triggering an MTD
operation based on intrusion alerts.
Shuffling, diversity, and redundancy are operations or mechanisms which
are based on ’how to move’ key design principle of MTD. Although these three
types of MTD operations can be used to classify MTD techniques, they often
support each other directly or indirectly in realizing their respective goals. We
summarize the connections between the SDR types and their goals in Fig. 2.4.
First, the concept of diversity is adopted from the principle that the diversity
of system components can enhance security (i.e., software polyculture enhances
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Figure 2.4: Relationships between shuffling, diversity and redundancy.
security [51, 55, 149]), leading to high system resilience (or robustness) even
in the presence of attacks. If system diversity is high, there exists a variety of
alternatives to the provision of the same service, such as multiple routes from
a source to a destination to deliver a message.
Second, shuffling also can enhance diversity because how to rearrange
system components can affect the degree of system diversity. For example,
a platform migration using a shuffling technique leads to higher diversity. How
to shuffle targets is closely related to how much cost incurs from shuffling
the targets and, accordingly, how much it can enhance security or interrupt
services to normal users. The effectiveness of shuffling is also affected by
how diverse a target is in nature. For example, given a network, we want
to increase the number of different types of software that provides the same set
of services. However, if we only have one or two software types, then there is an
inherent limitation of the performance achievable by the shuffling operation.
On the other hand, if the shuffling is optimally performed, system diversity
also increases, leading to higher system resilience against attacks.
Finally, high diversity and effective shuffling are critical to increasing
redundancy for achieving higher reliability (or availability) while properly
dealing with attackers. Particularly, if redundancy is high with low diversity
due to a poor or no shuffling technique, it can also be leveraged by the attackers
to use alternate ways to get into the system persistently. Therefore, these three
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types of techniques, shuffling, diversity, and redundancy, namely SDR, impact
each other and should be considered in combination to enhance system security
or resilience properly.
These two classification methods answer two different design questions in
developing MTD techniques (i.e., when-to-move and how-to-move). Hence, we
can even consider both timeliness-based and operation-based classifications in
order to develop a secure, affordable, adaptive, and QoS-aware MTD solutions.
2.3 Attacks Modeling in MTD
In this section, we discuss the characteristics of attacks considered in
the state-of-the-art MTD techniques. We discuss (1) the characteristics of
advanced attacks in Section 2.3.1; (2) the cyber kill chain model in Section 2.3.2;
(3) attack types mainly considered in the existing MTD approaches in
Section 2.3.3; and (4) discussion on the limitations of existing attack models
in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Characteristics of Advanced Attacks
MTD techniques have been developed in order to deal with increasingly
more sophisticated, intelligent, and persistent attacks equipped with more
advanced tools. We discuss the key characteristics of these advanced attackers
as follows:
• Persistent attackers: In the existing MTD works, we found that
attackers are persistent, not performing an one-time attack (e.g., APT
attacks [18, 43, 48, 67]). This persistent attack behavior is well
observed in multi-stage attacks that start from scanning attacks in the
reconnaissance stage before attacks obtaining access into a system (i.e.,
outside attackers) and continue to the attack delivery or exploitation
stage after they break into the system (i.e., inside attackers).
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• Adaptive attackers: Attackers are adaptive to dynamically changing
system conditions and external environmental conditions, as they take
into consideration both physical and cyber accessibility. These attackers
also have intelligence with regard to their resources, executing adaptive
attacks [80, 156, 162] that wisely manage their resource limits and at the
same time opportunistically seek to compromise an entire system.
• Stealthy attackers: Attackers do not exhibit an identifiable attacking
behavior all the time. They perform attacks in a highly stealthy
manner [3, 73], even showing well-behaved features of good citizens.
However, at a time when an attack is calculated to inflict serious harm
or damage to the system, they exhibit attack behaviors. However, they
stay stealthy until the time comes.
• Incentive-driven attackers: MTD is developed to deal with smart
attackers. In particular, attackers are intelligent enough to execute
attacks efficiently, such that the attack has a minimal cost but maximal
outcome. Therefore, we can consider the attacker to be a rational actor
that is sensitive to incentives, such as attack success with minimum
cost [50].
As a typical type of sophisticated attacks, the Advanced Persistent Threat
(APT) has been commonly considered as an attack-type techniques need to
countermeasure [18, 43, 48, 67, 128, 172]. More or less, APT attackers show
the above features in performing their attacks and are often described under
the scenario of the Cyber Kill Chains [70]. In the next section, we discuss an
overview of the cyber kill chain and the behavior of an APT attack at each
stage of the chain to understand how MTD techniques need to consider APT
attacks.
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2.3.2 Cyber Kill Chain
A new class of adversaries with sufficient resources and high intelligence
has emerged, which is the so-called ‘Advanced Persistent Threat (APT),’
as mentioned in Section 2.3.1. APT is capable of multi-year intrusion
campaigns to obtain highly sensitive information, such as proprietary corporate
information or national security secrets [70]. In order to defend against APTs,
an intelligence-based defense model is critical to defenders for mitigating the
risk and vulnerability of attacks to a system. Hutchins et al. [70] developed the
intelligence-based defense model, called the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC), based on
multiple phases of a cyber attack. The CKC model provides: (1) the description
of intrusion phases; (2) mapping the indicators of adversary kill chain to the
courses of defense actions; (3) the pattern identification associating individual
intrusions with broader campaigns; and (4) the understanding of iterative
intelligence gathering. The CKC model consists of the following phases [70]:
1. Reconnaissance: This phase involves researching, identifying, or selecting
targets, often by crawling Internet websites to obtain target information,
such as email addresses, social relationships, or information regarding
particular technologies the target system uses.
2. Weaponization: This phase uses a remote access trojan to be coupled with
an exploit into a deliverable payload (e.g., Adobe Portable Document
Format or Microsoft Office documents) using an automated tool, called
a weaponizer.
3. Delivery: In this phase, the weapon is transmitted to a targeted system
using delivery vectors for weaponized payload by APT actors (e.g., email
attachments, website, and USB removable media).
4. Exploitation: After the delivery of the weapon to a victim host, the
intruders’ code is triggered by exploitation, commonly targeting for an
application or OS vulnerabilities.
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5. Installation: The adversary can stay inside the target environment by
installing a remote access trojan or backdoor on the target (or victim)
system.
6. Command & Control (C2): Compromised hosts try to establish a C2
channel by beaconing outbound to an Internet controller server. Upon
the establishment of the C2 channel, the intruders can take control of the
target system (e.g., ‘hands on the keyboard’).
7. Actions on Objectives: After the previous six phases are successfully
performed, adversaries launch attacks to breach security goals (e.g., data
integrity, availability, confidentiality).
Okhravi et al. [117], and Ward et al. [159] described CKC model in a
shorter version with the phases of reconnaissance, access, exploit development,
attack launch, and persistence in which the ‘access’ phase incorporates the
‘weaponization’ and ’delivery’ phases from [70] and the ‘attack launch’ phase
incorporates ‘installation’ and ‘C2’ [70] as well.
2.3.3 Attacks Considered in MTDs
In this section, we discuss common types of cybersecurity attacks considered
and mitigated in the existing MTD approaches.
• Reconnaissance (or scanning) attacks: Scanning attacks are used
by attackers to gather information and intelligence about a target
system before an actual attack is launched. The attackers usually
use a customized set of software tools (e.g., Nmap [101]) to scan the
target system (or network) to find information, such as OS types, IP
addresses, port numbers, running services, protocols, network topology,
and exploitable vulnerabilities. An attacker/scanner performs scanning
by sending probe packets (e.g., ICMP echo request message or TCP SYN,
TCP ACK, TCP Xmas, UDP port scanning, etc.) to the target host(s)
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in the networks. To counter reconnaissance attacks, several network
address-based approaches have been proposed [74, 3, 2, 3, 23, 44, 73,
85, 99]. Similarly, MT6D [45] provides a mechanism to thwart scanning
attacks in the IPv6 environment by dynamically changing IP addresses
to invalidate scan results.
• DoS (or DDoS) attacks: A DDoS attack uses a large number of
botnets (i.e., a set of bots, consisting of compromised machines, or zombie
machines) to attack a targeted system by flooding traffic messages (e.g.,
UDP floods, ICMP floods, and/or SYN floods) from multiple sources to
force it to shut down or to deny services to legitimate users. DDoS often
involve time-based attacks that can cause targeted systems to miss critical
deadlines for updates or to fail to complete critical tasks. Common MTD
approaches to handle these attacks include the use of hidden proxies,
IP/port shuffling and/or address mapping [13, 32, 52, 59, 80, 79, 85,
93, 143, 147, 162, 109]. For example, Meier et al. [109] proposed a
novel network obfuscation approach and implemented a framework named
‘NetHide’ which can successfully battle against the possible attacks such
as Link-Flooding Attacks (LFAs) launched by even advanced attackers.
The MTD strategy behind the NetHide is to change and modify path
tracing probes in the data plan. They showed that NetHide could hold
a trade-off between security (i.e., creating difficulties for attackers) and
usability (e.g., high accuracy and low network functionality degradation).
Their results showed that NetHide could mitigate the probability of
attack success by 1% while it provides 90% and 72% accuracy and
utility, respectively. Moreover, MOTAG [79] mitigates the flooding DDoS
attacks using hidden proxies as moving targets to secure service access
for authenticated clients.
• Buffer overflow attacks: This kind of attack usually happens due
to a lack of buffer boundary checking. Common memory protection
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techniques, such as Address Space-Layout Randomization (ASLR) [137],
and Address Space Layout Permutation (ASLP) [86], are proposed to
thwart the buffer overflow attack. These techniques randomize the
memory position of data and program segment, library, and so forth.
Manadhata [104] and Manadhata and Wing [106] also considered a buffer
overflow, leveraging the attack surface of a defense system and proposed
a countermeasure against it by reducing or shifting the attack surface in
terms of the system’s methods, channels, or data items.
• Worm attacks: A worm is malicious software (malware) that replicates
itself and employs a network to spread itself to other machines by relying
on existing bugs or holes in the target system. The worms cause damages,
such as consuming bandwidth or turning a worm-infected computer into
a botnet that can be used by the worm’s programmer to profit by sending
spam or conducting DDoS attacks. A countermeasure against worm
attacks is Network Address Space Randomization (NASR) [3, 10, 76]
that randomizes the host IP address (i.e., IP shuffling).
• APT attacks: APT attacks are well known as one of the sophisticated
attack types aiming to access system resources, control them, and perform
exfiltration attacks (e.g., leaking sensitive or confidential information out
to unauthorized parties) by performing stealthy, persistent, and adaptive
attacks [2, 9, 24, 25, 29, 50]. The behaviors of APT attackers can be
observed in the cyber kill chain, which is described in Section 2.3.2.
APT attacks are also called ‘multi-stage attacks’ that refer to attackers
performing multiple attacks across multiple stages. For example, the
attacks range from network scanning and packet sniffing to illegitimate
authentication and service interruption (e.g., Stuxnet virus) [18, 43, 48,
128, 172].
• Side-channel attacks on VMs: Attackers perform attacks over side
channels based on the shared CPU cache of a VM in order to obtain
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sensitive information [170].
• Attacks on Web applications: Diverse types of attacks can be
performed on web applications, such as SQL injection, directory traversal,
and cross-site scripting, which breach the key security goals that are
confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability. These types of attacks can
be countermeasured by software stack diversity and/or redundancy [112,
135, 165].
We summarized the main attack types considered in existing MTD approaches
such as shuffling, diversity and redundancy with 36 researches (i.e., papers)
published for 2010-2018 in Fig. 2.5, Fig. 2.6 and Fig. 2.7 respectively. Note
that more than one technique or attack can be considered in each work. The
three major attacks the existing MTD techniques have mainly addressed are
reconnaissance attacks, DoS attacks, and APT attacks. Also, most proposed
approaches are shuffling-based MTD while diversity-based MTD techniques are
often combined with the shuffling-based techniques. But redundancy-based
techniques are rarely discussed to deal with the attack behaviors addressed
above because the redundancy-based approaches have been studied in the
dependability domain (e.g., reliability, availability) rather than for MTD and
often used in combination with either shuffling-based or diversity-based MTD
techniques.
2.3.4 Discussion on Existing Attack Models of MTDs
In this section, we discuss on limitations of the existing attack models
considered in MTD based on attacker types and attack behaviors described
in Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.3.
• Smart and intelligent attackers are significantly less considered: Most
MTD techniques are shuffling-based to deal with attacks. If attackers are
intelligent such that they can detect defense patterns by using learning
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Figure 2.7: Attack types considered in redundancy-based MTDs.
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mechanisms (e.g., machine learning or cognitive learning), then they can
easily capture what types of MTD techniques are used and what the
patterns are to trigger an MTD operation. However, highly intelligent,
learning attackers are not considered. Generally, it is assumed that
attackers have certain attack patterns, rather than that they learn and
can launch adaptive attacks. Whereas the contrary is true for defenders,
they are often permitted to take proactive, adaptive defense actions based
on an assumed highly intelligent learning capability.
• Few scenarios are considered to deal with multiple strategies by attackers
and defenders: A specific attack type can be easily mitigated or prevented
by a particular MTD technique. However, if an attacker identifies an
exploit that is not covered by the deployed MTD technique, the attacker
can even use the exploit and successfully launch its attack to penetrate
the system. Unfortunately, most MTD approaches focus on a single or a
small set of attacks, and few scenarios have considered multiple strategies
that can be taken by attackers or defenders. For example, the attacker
may need to decide which system vulnerability it needs to target while
the defender may want to determine which defense mechanism needs to
be used, where both parties aim to choose a cost-effective decision under
resource-constrained, time-sensitive settings.
• An attacker has been less considered as a rational decision-maker with
learning ability: The smart attackers can leverage how MTD works and
what side-effect the MTD can introduce. Also, they can capture the
defense patterns for an adaptive MTD, which aims to realize a cost-
effective MTD. However, attackers with learning capability and their
mental models have been rarely studied while high intelligence with
the defender and corresponding intelligent MTD (e.g., machine learning-
based MTD) is easily assumed and has been proposed [33, 152, 155, 171].
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2.4 Metrics for Assessing MTDs
In this section, we discuss what existing metrics have been proposed to
assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the existing MTD techniques. Along
with the discussions of the overall trends observed from this literature review,
we discuss some limitations of the metrics used in the state-of-the-art MTD
approaches.
2.4.1 Metrics for Measuring Effectiveness of MTDs
Diverse security assessment models and metrics have been proposed
for measuring the effectiveness of the MTD techniques. Zaffarano et al.
[166] proposed a quantitative framework measuring productivity, success,
confidentiality, and integrity for given missions and attacks models. Taylor
et al. [150] performed a series of experiments to assess the effectiveness of
network-based MTDs using the metrics in [166]. However, the usage of the
models is limited to evaluating network-based MTDs, such as ARCSYNE
(Active Repositioning in Cyberspace for SYNchronized Evasion), and SDNA
(Self-shielding Dynamic Network Architecture) [164]. Carroll et al. [23]
proposed a probabilistic model and analyzed for the performance of the
network address shuffling MTD technique. However, the model is designed
only for the assessment of address shuffling-based MTD technique. Several
entropy-based approaches [177, 102] have been proposed for the quantitative
security assessment of MTD techniques. However, the accuracy of the entropy-
based metrics is based on probability distribution measuring the likelihood of
happening the event.
We study the existing metrics to measure the effectiveness of MTD
techniques in terms of the perspectives of an attacker and a defender.
The attacker’s metric estimates its attack performance, indicating that the
attacker’s high performance refers to the defender’s low performance, and vice-
versa. The defender’s metric measures its performance in achieving the security
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and/or defense goals of a given system. The attacker’s metrics estimate the
adverse impact of the proposed MTD techniques on the attacker’s performance
and the metrics are obtained by:
• Attack success probability (ASP) [3, 9, 18, 23, 24, 26, 29, 43,
48, 130, 166]: This metric refers to the probability that attacks are
successfully performed. For example, it refers to the probability that a
system component (or defender) is compromised or a target is successfully
discovered and/or accessed by an attacker. Rahman et al. [130] also
used a metric called attackability, which refers to the probability that an
attacker can access system states (or components) to the attack. This
metric combines the degree of system vulnerability plus the feasibility of
an attacker accesses and performs an attack based on its resource level.
However, in the sense that it measures the degree for the attacker to
successfully access a system component, this metric is aligned with ASP.
• Attack utility [5, 6, 18, 112, 128, 172, 173]: When the interactions
between attackers and defenders and their best strategies are considered
based on game-theoretic approaches, the payoff (or utility) of an attacker
is used to measure the gain or loss by deploying a proposed MTD.
• Learning by attackers [172]: This measures the degree of an attacker’s
leaning toward the payoff obtained by a defender upon the performed
attack.
• Mean time to compromise a system (MTTC) [4, 24, 25, 29, 176]:
This indicates how long an attacker takes to compromise an entire system.
In terms of a defender’s perspective, this metric is similar to mean time
to failure (MTTF), as described under a defender’s metrics below.
• Unpredictability [58, 103, 138]: This indicates how much confusion
and/or uncertainty a given MTD has introduced to attackers.
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• Attack surface [106, 105]: This metric is defined as the number of
system resources that can be used by attackers to attack the system,
such as channels, data items, and/or methods. Hence, a larger attack













Figure 2.8: Metrics measuring MTD effectiveness by an attacker’s perspective.
In the literature, various types of the defender’s metrics are used to measure
MTD effectiveness in terms of the following metrics:
• Defense success probability (DSP) [3, 31, 33, 166]: We call metrics
measuring the success of an MTD technique DSP in this work. Zaffarano
et al. [166] estimated the rate of executing successful defenses (e.g., for
a defender, the rate at which tasks are executed and completed) or
attacks (e.g., for an attacker, the rate at which attacks are performed
and successfully completed). Colbaugh and Glass [33] used a detection
accuracy of anomaly behaviors, such as attack behaviors or spams, in
order to determine whether to trigger an MTD operation. Clark et al.
[31] measured the portion of decoy nodes detected by attackers when IP
randomization techniques are used in order to measure the success of the
IP-shuffling MTD strategy. Al-Shaer et al. [3] measured an IP-mutation
success probability to measure the effectiveness of the MTD. This metric
measures the probability that a mutated IP is not hit by scanning attacks.
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• Mean time to failure (MTTF) [24, 25, 29, 176]: This refers to a
system reliability metric capturing the system’s up-time in the presence
of attacks when failures can happen due to either defects or security
threats. This metric is the same as MTTC under the attacker’s metrics.
• Defense utility [18, 112, 128, 172, 173]: Game-theoretic approaches for
the optimal deployment of MTD techniques have taken to identify the
best defense strategy by a defender. The payoff (or utility) of the defender
measures the effectiveness of an MTD technique.
• Learning by defenders [172]: This metric measures the degree of a
defender’s leaning toward the payoff an attacker has obtained upon a
defense action taken by the defender.
• System security: Various kinds of metrics measure the system security
properties enhanced by proposed MTD techniques:
– Confidentiality [128, 170, 166]: This measures how many system
components are compromised [128]. In some contexts, some
information should be kept confidential, such as private information.
The degree of preserving confidential or private information is
another metric to indicate the degree of security. In [166],
mission confidentiality refers to the degree of exposing confidential
information to unauthorized parties while attack confidentiality
means the degree of attack behaviors detected by a defender.
– Integrity [166]: Integrity metric is discussed in terms of mission
integrity and attack integrity. Mission integrity refers to how much
information related to executing a given mission is communicated
without being modified and/or forged, while attack integrity
indicates how much accurate information the attackers’ view.
– Availability [58, 128]: This indicates the portion of system assets
that are not compromised to provide a normal service.
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– Degree of vulnerability [4, 5, 6, 18, 23, 24, 25, 172]: This
measures the probability that a given platform to be selected is
vulnerable during a particular period, or a given system component
is vulnerable because an attacker controls it.
• Other metrics: Based on the unique features of each of the existing
MTD approaches, various other types of metrics have been adopted to
measure the effectiveness of MTD as follows:
– Controllability [128]: This refers to the portion of critical
system assets that expose a high vulnerability to an attacker if
compromised.
– Worm propagation speed [3, 74, 73]: This measures how much
a deployed MTD can slow down actions by an attacker. This also
indirectly increases the detection of attackers by earning more time
to monitor the attacker.
– Vastness [58, 103, 105, 170]: This measures the size of spaces
that a given defense mechanism can cover, such as IP spaces an
attacker needs to scan through. Also, the number of target hosts
set by a defender can consume an attacker’s resource because it
determines all the possibilities the attacker needs to scan through.
In [105], this is considered based on the metric called ‘attack surface
measurements.’
– Periodicity [58, 103]: This estimates how often system
configurations change in order to provide a sufficient level of
confusion to attackers.
– Uniqueness [58, 103]: This measures how uniquely an individual
entity (e.g., a host) is authorized to a system without being accessed
by other entities.
– Revocability [58, 103]: This measures the degree of frequency to
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terminate or expire a prior system configuration (e.g., access control
or a given IP configuration).
– Distinguishability [58, 103]: This measures how well a given
defense distinguishes trustworthy entities from non-trustworthy
entities.
– Loss in rewards between an optimal deployment and an
executed deployment [135]: This metric captures how much loss














Figure 2.9: Metrics measuring the effectiveness of the MTDs by a defender’s
perspective.
The metrics to measure the effectiveness of existing MTD techniques are
summarized in Figs. 2.8 and 2.9 based on 27 papers published during 2011-
2018.
2.4.2 Metrics for Measuring Efficiency of the MTDs
The attacker’s metrics are used to capture how much cost (or penalty)
is introduced for an attacker to achieve attack success when a proposed MTD
is deployed, as follows:
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• Penalty in attack payoff [50, 79, 162, 170]: Many game theoretic MTD
approaches estimate attack cost at an abstract level (e.g., the cost is 1
for attacking; 0 otherwise).
• Attack cost [6, 5, 81, 104]: This measures how much overhead and/or
impact is introduced to attackers to perform their attacks. To be specific,
an attacker’s scanning tool, such asNmap, is used to capture the scanning
overhead [81].
The MTD efficiency by the attacker’s perspective is mainly measured by two
types of metrics as above, although both metrics are concerned about resources
the attacker needs to invest to launch a planned attack. Due to the similar
nature of both metrics and their small volume, we omit the figure.
The defender’s metrics to measure MTD efficiency that are
commonly observed in the literature include:
• Quality-of-Service (QoS) to users [31, 60, 162]: This metric captures
the degree of service quality provided to users while implementing a given
MTD technique as triggering an MTD (e.g., platform migration) often
hinders service availability to normal users [60, 162]. Also, upon deploying
IP mutation techniques, the number of connections interrupted [31] is
used to measure QoS provided to users.
• System performance [7, 30, 32, 45, 52, 60, 72, 95, 110, 127, 155,
156, 168]: This metric measures how much overhead is introduced to
deploy a given MTD, such as message overhead (e.g., delay, packet loss,
or control packet overhead) [45, 168], operational delay [110, 168] /
cost [52, 60, 155, 156, 168] to deploy an MTD, the number of dropped
connections [32], or performance overhead (e.g., file sizes or performance
degradation to distribute software for diversity) [72]. System performance
is also captured by system throughput measuring how much a given
system (or network) can maintain its performance in terms of network
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throughput (e.g., how many messages are correctly delivered) [7, 168] or
server throughput (e.g., how many queries are properly provided) [127].
• Defense cost: Various aspects of defense cost are measured to indicate
the efficiency of MTD techniques. An abstract level of defense cost (i.e.,
migration cost or maintenance cost of VMs) [29, 50, 79, 162, 170] is used
to measure the cost of a deployed MTD mechanism, which is mostly
used in game-theoretic MTD. Some defense cost captures the level of
infrastructure (e.g., several numbers of proxies or decoy nodes) required
to ensure a required level of service availability [79, 162]. Some other
works also used specific metrics to capture defense cost as follows:
– Address space overhead [3]: In deploying Random IP mutation
techniques, this refers to the required address space based on
mutation speed (e.g., low-frequency mutation, LFM, or high-
frequency mutation, HFM).
– Flow table size [74, 73, 168]: This measures the size of flow table in
OpenFlow (OF) switches when OF-RHM (Random Host Mutation)
is used in an SDN-based MTD.
– Integrated performance cost [32, 52]: This metric integrates
both performance and security cost. Ge et al. [52] considered
bandwidth cost and risk at servers upon being attacked to calculate
the overall performance cost. Clark et al. [32] defined the cost
function in terms of the number of active sessions, caused by
triggering MTD operations, and the fraction of decoy nodes scanned
by attackers. In these works, the goal is to minimize the performance
cost that reflects defense cost, security, and service availability to
users.
– Strategy switching cost [135]: This cost measures the switching
cost (e.g., migration cost). Sengupta et al. [135] estimated the
switching cost in switching web-stack configurations as a cost metric.
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– Power consumption [167]: When MTD is deployed in resource-
constrained environments such as wireless sensor networks or
IoT environments, energy consumption is one of the key design
considerations. How much benefit is introduced over the power
consumption by deploying an MTD technique is a critical metric
to measure the efficiency of the MTD.
The metrics to measure the efficiency of MTD by a defender’s perspective are
summarized in Fig. 2.10 based on 25 papers published during 2011-2018. Since
more than one metric can be used in a paper, the number of metrics countered







Figure 2.10: Metrics measuring the efficiency of the MTDs by a defender’s
perspective.
2.4.3 Discussion on Existing MTD Metrics
Different types of metrics have been proposed for assessing the effectiveness
and efficiency of the MTDs. The majority of the existing metrics have been
designed based on attacker’s and defender’s perspectives. The general trends
observed from this study are: (1) the attack success probability (e.g., whether
an attacker achieved its goal of a launched attack such as finding a vulnerable
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target) is a dominant metric used for the effectiveness of MTD aiming to
minimize this metric; (2) due to a large volume of game-theoretic approaches
in the state-of-the-art MTD techniques, the payoff or utility of attackers or
defenders is also one of dominant metrics used in the existing MTD techniques;
and (3) some system-level metrics measuring system vulnerability or reliability
(e.g., degree of vulnerability, MTTF or mean time to compromise an entire
system) in the presence of attacks are observed as major metrics used to
measure MTD effectiveness. Similarly, as demonstrated in Fig. 2.10, most
metrics measuring MTD efficiency belong to system performance or defense
cost. However, the level of QoS provided to users is significantly less studied.
This means MTD technology focuses more on enhancing system security and
performance with minimum cost while service available for users to provide
seamlessly, continuous service provision has remained much less explored in
designing MTD techniques. Since deploying and executing MTD mechanisms
to a system introduces a critical tradeoff between security, defense cost, and
service availability, an optimization problem with these conflicting dual goals
should be investigated in-depth to meet multiple criteria from both system
goals (i.e., multi-objective optimization problem) [28].
2.5 Summary
MTD takes a non-conventional perspective toward defensive security,
which aims to enhance security by changing the attack surface, rather than
eliminating all the vulnerabilities of system components, representing the
conventional security goal. Based on this principle, MTD can provide a
way to build proactive, adaptive, and affordable defense mechanisms that can
leverage the existing technologies (e.g., SDN or Cloud) while enhancing system
security. A large volume of the network address (e.g., IP, port) shuffling
MTD mechanisms have been proposed for the different application domains
(e.g., conventional network, SDN, Cloud). However, there are limited IP
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and/or port shuffling MTD mechanisms that have been proposed for the SDNs.
Besides, they often deploy in a conventional network and lack leveraging SDN
technology. Leveraging the SDN technology enables flexibility to implement
the operations of the MTD mechanisms. Therefore, there is a need for the
development of SDN-based MTD approaches to effectively shuffle IP address
and/or port numbers of the host of a target system.
The effectiveness and efficiency of MTD are measured by using a variety
of metrics in terms of the perspectives of both an attacker and a defender.
Attack success probability, attack utility, mean time to compromise, system
security (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and availability), and defense cost,
system performance are the popular metrics used to assess the effectiveness
and efficiency of the deploying MTD techniques respectively. However, the
metrics have not yet well discussed on how to capture the dynamics of the




Flexible Random Virtual IP
Multiplexing
This chapter presents the proposed MTD mechanism, named FRVM. The
FRVM is an SDN-based MTD technique that provides a flexible network
address shuffling mechanism aiming to thwart network reconnaissance and
scanning attacks. We introduce FRVM defense mechanism in Section 3.1,
consider system and attacker models are described in Section 3.2 and
Section 3.3 respectively. The detailed explanation of our proposed MTD
approach (e.g., FRVM), including system architecture, algorithms, and
communication protocols is presented in Section 3.4. The implementation
and security evaluation of the proposed FRVM is discussed in Section 3.5.
Similarly, the performance overhead of the FRVM deploying in SDN is analyzed
in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 summaries the work presented in this chapter.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• Propose a novel SDN-based MTD technique that provides flexibility to
have multiple, random, time-variant IP addresses in a host, and this
creates an environment with high diversity that significantly decreases
the attacker success rate;
• Develop system architecture, algorithms, and communication protocols
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of the FRVM which is feasible to deploy on an SDN-based network
infrastructure;
• Derive probabilistic analytical models for analyzing and evaluating the
effectiveness of the FRVM;
• Analyze the performance of the FRVM in terms of attacker success
probability under scanning attacks and defense costs considering the end-
to-end delay and throughput overheads.
3.1 Introduction
The concept of MTD has been introduced to increase uncertainty and
confusion for attackers by continuously and dynamically changing the attack
surface on a system. The dynamic defense based on MTD techniques has
been often applied at different levels of the system [119]. At the system
level, the example MTD techniques aim to change the system and/or system’s
properties dynamically in terms of randomizing instruction sets [16, 83, 127],
run-time environment [163], address space layout [137], VM migration [122],
OS-rotation [151]. At the network level, the common MTD techniques are
related to the shuffling of the network attributes, including mutation of IP
address [3, 10, 74], port hopping [93, 143], route mutation [44], and/or network
reconfiguration [65]. The well-known existing network address shuffling MTD
techniques [3, 74, 73] randomly mutate an IP address of a host mapping to a
virtual IP address in a one-to-one manner. One-to-one mapping requires more
virtual IP addresses to satisfy the mutation rate constraint and unpredictability
for the hosts in the network, which often results in a lack of scalability due
to a limited address space. Also, they have been evaluated for the effect of
scanning worm attacks, which cannot determine the exact attacker’s work effort
in terms of scan success based on the scanning time; and lack to investigate the
performance overhead incurred due to the deployment of the MTD mechanism
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on the SDN environment.
In this chapter, we propose a novel MTD technique called Flexible Random
Virtual IP Multiplexing (FRVM) in an SDN-based environment that enables a
host to have multiple, random, and/or time-varying virtual IP addresses (vIPs).
FRVM creates short-lived, random vIP address(es) for each service of the host.
These vIP addresses are mapped to a real IP (rIP) address of the host. It
allows a full range of vIPs to the host for different services by mapping in a
M − to−N manner where M refers to the number of rIP and N is the number
of vIP. The vIP addresses are changed randomly and frequently with a certain
time interval in order to invalidate the target system’s information collected
by the attacker and lower down predictability of the changing patterns of the
addresses. The rIP address of the host remains unchanged and transparent
to the end-user. This SDN-based MTD solution defends against network
reconnaissance and scanning attacks. We consider scanning attacks that are
typically used for gathering the system’s security-related information before
launching the actual attacks. The attacker often uses a customized scanning
software tools for collecting the target system’s information such as operating
system types, IP addresses, TCP/UDP open ports, running services, protocols,
network topology, and/or exploitable vulnerabilities. The proposed FRVM
provides high network diversity in terms of IP addresses of the hosts that can
significantly disturb the attacker’s scanning strategies and accordingly reduces
the attacker’s success.
3.2 System Model
Software-defined networking is a promising technology that can provide
flexibility, robustness, and programmability [136]. The flexibility and
programmability of the SDN technology can be applied to several cybersecurity
network applications. The SDN architecture decouples the network control
and forwarding functions enabling the network control to become directly
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programmable and underline infrastructure to be abstracted for applications
and network services [88]. An SDN-based environment consists of SDN-
switches (i.e., Open vSwitches) and SDN-controllers (e.g., Ryu [133],
OpenDaylight [108], ONTO [19], etc.), communicating over a secure channel.
The controller on the SDN is responsible for controlling the forwarding
operations of the switches in a centralized manner. The SDN controller can
enable a switch to rewrite the packet headers and steer the traffic towards
a specific host by simply updating the forwarding table of the switch via an
OpenFlow (OF)-protocol [107]. Each SDN switch has its flow table with flow
rules. The SDN-switch routes packets based on the flow-rules defined in the
flow-table. The SDN-switch forwards a packet to the controller if it does not
match the flow-rule installed in the flow-table. The controller adds a new flow
rule for that packet or drops it. The end-hosts are connected with OF-switch.
The programmable interfaces afforded by the SDN-based environment can be
comforted to achieve a proactive, dynamic defensive strategy based security
including moving target defense.
We consider the SDN-based system model in which end-hosts are called
server-hosts, which offer several services to end-users. Each server-host should
have at least one active service where a server can have multiple services (e.g.,
web services, application services etc.). TCP/UDP port numbers identify the
active services running on the server-hosts, and a vIP is assigned to each active
service of the server host. A combination of vIP and port number (i.e., vIP:
Port) can be used to communicate within the SDN network infrastructure.
Fig. 3.1 describes our system model consisting of the control plane with a
controller (e.g., an SDN controller) and the data plan with switches and hosts
(e.g., Open vSwitches and server machines).
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Figure 3.1: FRVM System Architecture
3.3 Attacker Model
Network address shuffling-based MTD mechanism disrupts attackers at the
early stage of the attack process. We devise an attacker model based on Cyber
Kill Chain (CKC) [70], where the attacker seeks to perform reconnaissance
on the target network while the system defense mechanism ( e.g., FRVM)
aims to hide the IP addresses and/or services. The attacker selects a random
IP address and performs network and port scanning to discover the server-
hosts (e.g., used IP addresses) and active services (e.g., TCP/UDP ports) for
planning and launching the attacks. The attacker adopts a non-repeat random
scanning strategy where the attacker scans an IP only once and discards it (i.e.,
never scans the same IP again). In this work, we assume that the attacker has
a certain knowledge of the target system and its defense capabilities. Hence,
we make the following assumptions:
• An attacker is located outside the network;
• There are N total IP addresses (i.e., virtual IP address pool space), n
number of hosts and m-active currently running services on each host;
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• An attacker targets to discover a server-host and its active services;
• The attacker is aware of the virtual address pool size and will sequentially
attempt k connections or probes;
• The attacker can use scanning software tools (e.g., Nmap [101] and/or
Nessus [111]) to discover all hosts, services and/or vulnerabilities on the
target host;
• The multiplexing event of the FRVM dynamically remaps all vIPs at the
server-host by uniformly selecting vIPs at random and the attacker is
aware of the MTD technique running on the target network that shuffles
the IP addresses.
3.4 Proposed Approach
In this section, we present the description of each component of
our proposed MTD approach FRVM, which includes IP-mapping, system
architecture, mapping algorithms and communication protocols.
3.4.1 IP Mapping
In FRVM, each server-host has a real IP address, rIP, where the rIP is
mapped to a set of virtual IP addresses, vIPs, and a set of vIPs are mapped to an
rIP in an 1-to-n/n-to-1 manner, respectively. The mapping of one or more vIPs
to an rIP (i.e., vIPs-to-rIP) of each server-host is called ‘virtual IP multiplexing’
while the mapping of a rIP to vIPs mapping is called ‘de-multiplexing.’
The vIPs are unused, private IP addresses (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12 or
192.168.0.0/16). We define the multiplexing function in Eq. (3.1) that describes
the multiplexing of a set of vIPs (e.g.,vIP1, vIP2, · · · , vIPm) to a set of rIPs
(e.g., a rIP1) in m-to-1 manner. Similarly, the de-multiplexing function in
Eq. (3.2) details the de-multiplexing of a set of rIPs (e.g., rIP1) to a set of vIPs
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(e.g., vIP1, vIP2, · · · , vIPn) in an 1-to-n manner. To perform multiplexing/de-
multiplexing of IP addresses, Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) combine a vIP with a port
number (e.g., vIP : port).
fmultiplexing : VIP× P→ RIP (3.1)
fde−multiplexing : RIP→ P× VIP (3.2)
where RIP,VIP, and P denote finite set of all rIP addresses, vIP addresses,
and TCP/UDP port numbers respectively. As described in Section 3.3, each
server-host offers one or more services, and these services are identified with
the corresponding port number. A new vIP is generated randomly using a
cryptographically secured random number generator and assigned to the server
host’s service. All the randomly assigned vIPs to the server-host are changed
continuously based on a short period of the interval, called ‘multiplexing
interval,’ denoted by T . The rIP of the server-host remains unchanged while
rIP is hidden in the network, and routing is restricted to using vIPs. The
SDN controller handles all the mapping and remapping of addresses, changing
of vIPs of the server-host, and updating the flow-table entry of SDN switches
(e.g., OF-switches). The controller performs mapping of vIPs-to-rIP or rIP-to-
vIP at edge switch (i.e., just before the end-host). The mapping is transparent
to an end-user with no service disruption since rIPs, and corresponding port
numbers of a server-host remain unchanged. We assume that no one can reach
to the server-host using the rIP except the authorized network administrators.
A user can communicate either using a domain name/host-name or rIP, which
is described as the communication protocol in FRVM in Section 3.4.3.
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3.4.2 System Architecture of FRVM
FRVM defense mechanism is designed to deploy on SDN-based network
infrastructure. Fig. 3.1 depicts the FRVM architecture that comprises the
major components such as end-hosts, SDN controller, SDN switches, data
plane, and control plane. The end-hosts are connected with the SDN-switches
in the data plane. The SDN controller centrally controls data forwarding
network elements. The components of the FRVM system architecture can be
represented by:
• End-host(s): A set of end-hosts includes servers, workstations, and/or
gateway interface to routers, denoted by H={Host1, Host2, · · · , Hostn}
where |H| ≥ 2. Each end-host has an rIP assigned to it and a set of
rIPs is denoted by RIP ={rIP1, rIP2, · · · , rIPn}. A rIP is mapped
to one or more vIPs, and a set of all vIPs is denoted by VIP =
{vIP1, vIP2, · · · , vIPm}. Each server host offers a number of active
services listening on port numbers. A set of port numbers, denoted
by P={port1, port2, · · · , portm}.
• SDN Controller : A set controllers, denoted by C={C1, C2, · · · , Cr}. We
assume that a functional SDN network has at least one controller where
|C| ≥ 1. In our system, a single SDN controller exists that performs the
mapping of rIP-to-vIP or vIP-to-rIP, installs and updates necessary flows
in the SDN-switches. The SDN controller randomly and dynamically
changes vIPs of end-hosts and rIPs of the end-host machines remain
unchanged.
• SDN-switches : A set of SDN-witches, denoted by S ={S1,S2, · · · , Sl}.
Each SDN-switch forwards the data plane traffics based on the flow-rule
specified by the SDN controllers. Each switch, Si, includes ingress and
egress ports.
• Data plane: Representing a topological connectivity based on a set of
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network switches and end-hosts.
• Control plane: Representing relations between switches and controllers.
• End-users : A set of legitimate users, denoted by U={u1, u2, · · · , uj} that
access the services running on the servers in H.
• DNS servers : The domain name system (DNS) server resolves a domain
name of the server-host and returns a rIP address.
The IP multiplexing algorithm for an SDN-controller is presented in
Algorithm 1. The SDN-switch sends every unmatched packet to the controller
which determines the types of communication (e.g., domain-name or rIP),
performs the translation of IP addresses, and installs necessary flows. The
SDN-controller maps a real IP address of the destination host to a number of
virtual IP addresses and then updates the flow table of each SDN-switch (e.g.,
OF-switch). For example, Table 3.1 shows the state of a flow-table of an OF-
switch where destination rIPs are replaced with the vIPs. Table 3.2 shows the
mapping of 1-to-n/n-to-1 IP addresses using this algorithm. All rIPs hidden
within the SDN network packets are forwarded using the vIPs only. The SDN
controller dynamically changes vIPs for each service of a server-host in every
multiplexing time interval, T .
Table 3.1: Flow-table information of an SDN-Switch.
src IP dst IP dst Port# Action
IPA 10.0.0.103 80 Forward to PORT1 with dst IP 10.0.0.103 and dst Port# 80
IPB 10.0.0.103 80 Forward to PORT1 with dst IP 10.0.0.103 and dst Port# 80
IPC 10.0.0.100 23 Forward to PORT2 with dst IP 10.0.0.100 and dst Port# 23
IPD 192.168.0.31 21 Forward to PORT3 with dst IP 192.168.0.31 and dst Port# 21
3.4.3 Communication Protocol
We design a typical communication protocol for the FRVM defense
mechanism. An end-user of the system deploying the FRVM can have two
ways of communicating either using a ’domain-name/host-name’ or using a
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Multiplexing IP Addresses
1 for all packets p from host hi to hj do
2 if p is a Type-A DNS response for host hj then
3 Set dstAddr(p):=vIP(hj):dstPort;
4 else




9 if p is at source SDN-Switch then
10 Set scrAddr(p):=vIP(hi):srcPort ;
11 Set dstAddr(p):=rIP(hi):dstPort ;
12 end




17 for each service s of host hi do
18 Select a new vIP for each service s of hi ;
19 Update flow table entry;
20 end
21 end
rIP address. We assume that a normal user communicates using the domain
name, and only an authorized user (e.g., a network administrator) is allowed to
communicate using the rIP of the destination host, which is shown in Figs. 3.2
and 3.3, respectively. Fig. 3.2 shows that when a DNS query is sent to resolve
the domain-name (e.g, d name) of an end-host (e.g., Host2), then the DNS
response is intercepted by the SDN controller and the rIP of the destination
host (e.g, rIP2) is replaced with the virtual IP address (e.g., vIP1). As a result,
Table 3.2: IP address multiplexing/de-multiplexing examples.
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the source end-host (e.g., Host1) receives only a vIP (e.g., vIP2) mapping to the
destination host and initiates its communication with the destination service
port number (e.g., Port2). Similarly, a source host’s rIP (e.g., rIP1) of an
outgoing packet is replaced by a randomly selected vIP (e.g., vIP1). The SDN
controller installs necessary flows in the SDN-switches in the route. Further,
packets will be matched and forwarded by the SDN-switches according to the
installed flows in the flow table. The translation of the vIP-to-rIP will be
applied at the SDN-switch before the destination end-host. Fig. 3.3 shows how
an authorized user at a host (e.g., Host1) can reach an end-host (e,g., Host2)
using the real IP address. In this scenario, the client initiates connection using
rIP (e.g., rIP2) and port number (e.g., Port2) of the destination host (e.g.,
Host2), and the SDN controller requesting authorization for a received packet
from the source host (e.g., Host1). If access is granted, the SDN controller
replaces the rIP of the destination host (e.g., rIP2) with a randomly generated
vIP (e.g., vIP2), and then sends the packet to the SDN controller which installs
necessary flows in the SDN-switches. The authorization is assumed to be
performed per TCP or UDP connection. In the FRVM network, routing is
restricted to use only vIPs while rIPs are hidden within the network. The
multiplexing and de-multiplexing functions enable the association between the
destination port and the IP address.
Figure 3.2: Communication via domain-name.
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Figure 3.3: Communication via real IP address.
3.5 Implementation & Evaluation
In this section, we present implementation and security evaluation of
the proposed FRVM defense mechanism to validate its outperformance
over existing counterparts. The validation is performed using multiple
methods, including analytical models (e.g., deriving probabilistic models) and
simulations with security and performance metrics.
3.5.1 Implementation
We implemented a proof-of-concept FRVM on the SDN-based virtualized
networked system. A virtualized network environment is created using Oracle
VM VirtualBox [120] and Mininet [91] with Ryu [133] framework. We
developed a customized SDN controller called em FRVM controller based on
multiplexing algorithm outlined in Algorithm 1 in Section 3.4.2. Routers in the
FRVM deploying network are not allocated vIP addresses where they contact
through their rIP addresses, and the protection of the FRVM is not afforded
to the routers. Although as routers stitch networks together, they would
be reachable through an interface on the connected non-protected network.
Therefore, the loss of protection is minimal. Without a vIP address, the
routers have a static IP address allowing hosts within the network to use them
as default gateways. ARP translates MAC addresses to IP addresses within a
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network. This functionality is necessary for end-to-end communication. Ideally,
ARP packets would be treated similarly to IP packets, multiplexing and de-
multiplexing between vIP and rIP addresses, Unfortunately, multiplexing relies
on the inclusion of port numbers, of which ARP packets have none. The
solution involved implementing a queue for each host to identify which vIP
address of a host, an ARP response should be translated to a network edge.
This solution could also be applied to other portless protocols like the ICMP.
Our implementation proved that the FRVM is feasible for deploying in software-
defined networks.
3.5.2 Derivation of Attacker Success Probability
In this section, we derive attacker’s success probability distribution
functions for comparative study of the performance evaluation of a dynamic
network with MTD mechanism and a typical static IP configured network
without any other defense mechanisms (i.e., as a baseline model) adapting
the existing probabilistic approaches [80] [23] [37]. The notations N , n, k, and
x used in the derivation denote the address space size, number of target hosts,
number of scans, and number of successes, respectively.
A static network without MTD mechanism: In a static IP configured
network, the IP address assigned to an end-host remains unchanged. An
attacker’s strategy for discovering the end-host is to scan sequentially and
iterate through the address space. The attacker scans IP addresses adopting a
non-repeat random scanning strategy where he never repeats the address which
has been scanned before. We can model this scanning strategy with a hyper-
geometric distribution as the number of successes in a sequence of scans from a
finite set of IP addresses (i.e., address space) without replacement. Therefore,
the attacker success probability to discover the host(s) is determined using the
hyper-geometric distribution. Accordingly, the probability that the attacker
successfully obtains exactly x of n hosts in the address space N in k scans can
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be given by:











where k ≥ x, N ≥ n, and n ≥ x. The probability that the attacker successfully
discovers at least one target host is:









A dynamic network with MTD mechanism: In our work, the
multiplexing or de-multiplexing event (i.e., shuffling event) remaps all vIPs to
the end-hosts. We assume that the FRVM remaps all the IP addresses of the
end-hosts in every scanning attempt. An attacker’s success probability remains
the same for every scanning attempt. The attacker loses any reconnaissance
knowledge gained in every multiplexing event (i.e., every T interval time). The
attacker’s scan success probabilities are equal in each scan. We model this
scenario with a binomial probability distribution, and the attacker’s success is
determined as the number of success in a sequence of k-scans from a finite set of
IP addresses (i.e., address space) with replacement. The binomial probability
distribution function with the success probability p is:






where p = n
N
is the probability that the attacker discovers a host in each scan
and k ≥ x. The probability that the attacker successfully discovers at least one
target host in k scans is given by:
P (X ≥ 1) = 1− P (X = 0)
= 1− (1− p)k (3.6)
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If the attacker scans whole address space (i.e., k = N) with p = 1
N
(i.e., single
target) then Eq. (3.6) reduces to
P (X ≥ 1) = 1− (1− 1
N
)N . (3.7)
As the network address size N increases to a sufficiently large number (i.e.,
N →∞), the success probability converges to 1− (1− 1
N
)N = 1− e−1 ≈ 0.63.
3.5.3 Simulations & Experimental Setup
In this work, we focus on evaluating the effectiveness of the FRVM under
scanning attacks with respect to the attack success probability. As discussed
in Section 3.3, the attacker seeks to perform reconnaissance on the network
while the defense mechanism aims to keep the IP addresses (e.g., vIPs) hidden.
An attacker selects a random IP address to discover a target server-host, and
then performs port scanning on the host to discover the active services. We
consider a random scanning strategy (e.g., non-repeat scanning) to discover
IP addresses of the target server hosts and active service running ports of the
target server host. The host discovery (e.g., IP addresses) can be achieved
by sending an ICMP message to the target server host. Similarly, discovering
active services can be achieved by sending an SYN packet to the target server
using port scanning. We used security and performance metrics to evaluate
the effectiveness of the FRVM and its counterpart, a static network that uses
a static IP configuration. The simulation experimental environment (e.g.,
a virtualized SDN testbed) is created with a Mininet v2.2.2 [91] emulator
using Oracle VM VirtualBox 5.2.12 [120] Hypervisor, Linux Ubuntu 17.10 [96]
operating system, Intel i7-3770K with 4.20GHz CPU, Ryu v4.25 [133] SDN
controller and OpenFlow switch v2.8.1. We performed our experiments on
the virtualized testbed network with the FRVM controller, as described in
Section 3.5.1 and without FRVM (i.e., a typical static SDN controller).
We performed TCP connect port scanning using Nmap [101], and the
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attacker’s scan success is computed based on the level of information disclosure
(i.e., host and ports discovery) and scan duration. The duration of each scan is
collected as it directly impacts the amount of information collected by the
attacker that remained valid at the end of the scan. Before the attacker
scanned, each protected host randomly selected 10-ports to open in the inclusive
range of 50,000-50,999. This range is assumed to contain the 1000 most likely
open ports and was consolidated into a single block for simplicity. The port
numbers of each service are generated with a cryptographically secure random
number generator. The attacker scanned the port range 50,000-50,999 ( e.g.,
1000 most likely open ports) over class C IP addresses of IPv4. It is assumed
that the attacker knew the size of the network and the port range of randomly
opened ports. The network size could be identified using utilities Whois [40].
The port range was known from a list of well-known TCP ports scanned using
Nmap [101].
3.5.4 Simulation Results & Analysis
The scan duration was collected from network scans of the virtualized
network with FRVM (i.e., w/ FRVM) defense mechanism and without FRVM
defense mechanism (i.e., w/o FRVM). Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics
of scanning results for the network with FRVM and without FRVM using TCP
connect scan under different MTD interval time (i.e., T = 30s, 60s, and 90s).
For each variable a median is listed with lower and upper using the bootstrap
method [46]. The results shows that FRVM significantly increases the scan
duration consequence the attacker’s effort increases to discover the host and
services. We analyzed the results with some security metrics.
Attacker’s scan success probability: We use scan time-based attacker’s
success probability metric to evaluate the FRVM for the data sets obtained from
the testbed experiments presented in Table 3.3. Connell et al. [35] modeled
the MTD’s performance defining the attacker’s success probability based on a
function of time. We comparatively analyzed the effectiveness of the FRVM
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of scanning results.
Network Scan Duration (in second)
MTD interval x̃ Lower Upper
w/ FRVM
30 492.40 279.70 862
60 133.90 49.91 200.9
90 54.52 40.3 117.6
w/o FRVM - 52.89 50.12 54.08
controller against a static typical SDN controller adapting the attacker’s success
probability with linear and exponential functions [35]. A linear function































(a) A linear function































(b) An exponential function
Figure 3.4: Comparative analysis of the scanning results in term of attacker’s
scan success probability for a network w/ FRVM controller and w/o FRVM.
represents the probability of scan success increases linearly with time t and
success at time Ts. The probability of attack success in scanning t unit time
with the linear function of time can be defined by:




An exponential time function represents attacker’s learning in scanning where
the attacker initially accumulates knowledge in a low rate, increases scan rate
exponentially and becomes more knowledgeable over time, and succeeds at
time Ts. The probability of attack success in scanning given t time unit with
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an exponential function of time can be defined by:




The Eqs. (3.8) and (3.9) can be used to analyze the attack success with
port scanning using the observed total scanning time for a network with
FRVM controller (i.e., w/ FRVM) and a typical static SDN controller (i.e.,
w/o FRVM) respectively. Fig. 3.4 (a) and (b) show attacker’s scan success
probability for a network with a typical static SDN controller and the FRVM
controller using different multiplexing (i.e., MTD) interval time (i.e., T=30s,
60s, 90s) with respect to scan time using Eq. (3.8) and (3.9) respectively.
Fig. 3.4a shows that attacker’s success slightly increases (i.e., very low rate)
with scan duration using the shorter MTD interval time (i.e., T=30s and 60s).
However, it grows linearly with scan duration for the FRVM with T > 90s
and a typical static SDN controller. Similarly, Fig. 3.4b shows attacker success
probability using the exponential function of time. Initially, it has a very small
increment with the scan time and becomes exponential. However, the growth
rate of the success for the network with FRVM controller is significantly lower
than the counterpart SDN controller for T ≤ 90s. Based on these results,
our FRVM effectively increases the work effort of the attacker in terms of
scanning time for discovering all the hosts and active services (i.e., network
reconnaissance) in the FRVM protected network by 90% with multiplexing
interval time T = 30s. Moreover, it can be further enhanced its effectiveness
by decreasing the multiplexing interval time T . However, there is no significant
impact of it with the multiplexing interval time T ≥ 90s in our experimental
setup described in Section 3.5.3.
Deterrence: It measures the cost exerted on attacker in terms of time by
comparing completion time of an attack in the network with MTD and the
static network [76]. This metric can be used to evaluate the FRVM using the
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where Tmtd and Tstatic denote scan duration for a network w/ FRVM and
w/o FRVM respectively. Using the scan duration presented in Table 3.3, we
obtained Π=9.30, 2.53, and, 1.03 for the multiplexing intervals T = 30s, 60s
and 90s respectively. This shows that FRVM effectively deters the attacker
with the lower multiplexing interval time T ≥ 90s.
Effectiveness: In a network reconnaissance attack, the effectiveness of the
deploying MTD mechanism depends on how it increases the attacker’s work
effort or how it disrupts the attacker. We introduce a metric called effectiveness
that measures how much the attacker’s effort increased by deploying MTD in





Now, computing Γ for different multiplexing or MTD intervals T = 30s, 60s
and 90s with scan duration presented in Table 3.3 are Γ=830.98%, 153.16%,
and, 3.08% respectively. It shows that the FRVM increases the work effort to
the attacker by 830.98% deploying the FRVM with T = 30s.
3.5.5 Numerical Results & Sensitivity Analysis
The attacker’s success probability is affected by the various environmental
parameters such as available address space size, number of scans, number of
vulnerable hosts (i.e., target hosts) exist in the network. We analyzed the
sensitivity of the parameters to attacker success, discovering the hosts for both
a typical static network (i.e., w/o FRVM) and a dynamic network deploying
FRVM controller (i.e.,w/ FRVM) based on the probabilistic models described
in Section 3.5.2.
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Effect of the number of scans: Fig. 3.5a shows the attacker’s success
probability in scanning the network w/ FRVM and w/o FRVM controller using
the address size 210 with respect to the number of scans. The results show
that the ASP increases as the number of scans increases. For the typical
static network w/o FRVM, the ASP reaches to 1.0 (i.e., 100% scan success)
when the attacker scanned the whole available address space. However, in the
network w/ FRVM, the ASP slightly increases as the number of scans increases;
the ASP reaches up to 0.63 (i.e., 63%) when the attacker scanned the whole
address space. This implies that the attacker missed at least 37% of the hosts
when he scanned the whole network addresses. These results are obtained
for an equal address space pool used by both the attacker and defender to
scanning and multiplexing IP addresses, respectively. However, FRVM updates
only the small portion (q) of the address space during a scanning time of the
attacker. Therefore, the multiplexing rate of FRVM is higher than the attacker
scanning rate. In this scenario, ASP in terms of discovering a target host
decreases and becomes very low. For example, if the scanner will be able to
scan only 10% of the address space (N) and FRVM multiplexes all the IP
addresses in this time, ASP will be 9.5% (i.e., ASP = 0.095). This implies
that FRVM can effectively protect at least 90.5 % of the hosts/services from
discovery. Similarly, if the scanner scans only 5% of the total address space,
ASP reduces to 4.8% (i.e., ASP = 0.048); and for the 1% scan, ASP further
reduces to 0.9% (≈ 1%) (i.e., ASP = 0.0099). Similarly, Fig. 3.7a depicts
the defense performance of the network deploying FRVM controller in terms of
the attacker’s success probability discovering the host in scanning all the range
of private/unused IPs of the class A (e.g., 10.0.0.0/8), B (e.g., 172.16.0.0/12)
and C (e.g., 192.168.0.0/16) of IPv4 with respect to the number of scans. The
results show that the attacker’s success probability is 0.63 in scanning the
whole range of IP addresses of each class. The attacker’s effort increases (i.e.,
the attacker’s success decreases) in the order of the address space size. With a
large number of scans 224 = 1, 67, 77, 216, 220 = 10, 48, 576, and 216 = 65, 536,
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the attacker is able to discover only the 63% of the host (i.e., 37% hosts missed)
even when scanning the whole private IP addresses of A, B, and C classes
respectively. Therefore, FRVM effectively thwarts the network reconnaissance
and scanning attacks using the private IP addresses for virtual IP addresses of
the protected networked systems.
















































w/o FRVM (20% scan)
w/ FRVM (20% scan)
w/o FRVM (50% scan)
w/ FRVM (50% scan)
w/o FRVM (100% scan)
w/ FRVM (100% scan)
(b)
Figure 3.5: Comparative security analysis of the FRVM against a counterpart
in terms of ASP to discover the hosts.
Effect of the number of vulnerable hosts: As described in
Section 3.5.2, if the number of vulnerable hosts in the network increases,
then the attacker’s success probability will increase. Fig. 3.5b depicts the
attacker’s success probability to discover at least one target host in the network
containing multiple vulnerable targets with a different percent of the address
scanned. The results show that the attacker’s success increases as the number of
vulnerable hosts and scans increase. The FRVM controller significantly reduces
the attacker’s success as compared to the static network w/o FRVM controller.
Similarly, Fig 3.6a depicts the attacker’s success probability to discover the
host in the network deploying the FRVM controller varying the percentage
of addresses scanned with a different number of vulnerable hosts exist in the
network. The results show that the attacker’s success probability increases
with an increase in the percentage of the address scanned. The effect of the
FRVM is more pronounced under a small number of vulnerable hosts in the
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network.
























































Figure 3.6: Security analysis of the FRVM approach in terms of ASP to discover
a host in a network protected with FRVM mechanism.
Effect of available address size: The size of the available address pool
has a significant impact on reducing the attacker’s success. Fig 3.6b shows the
attacker’s success probability to discover a target host in a network deploying
FRVM with different vulnerable hosts. The results show that the attacker’s
success dramatically decreased as increasing the address size. However, there
is a negative impact on the vulnerable hosts that exist in the network.
ASP to discover multiple hosts: Fig. 3.7b shows ASP discovering
the multiple hosts in the targeted network with varying number of successes.
The result shows that the attacker’s success steeply reduces over the number
of successes, and its value is very low for the network w/ FRVM defense
mechanism ( e.g., FRVM controller) as compared to the static network w/o
FRVM mechanism. In this experiment, we set up a small network with 5
server hosts (n = 5) and 50 IP address size (N = 50) and computed ASP to
discover 1 host, 2 hosts, 3 hosts, 4 hosts and finally all 5 hosts for the both
networks ( e.g., w/ FRVM and w/o FRVM) in 10 scans or probes ( e.g., k = 10.
The result shows that FRVM gradually reduces ASP to successfully discover
multiple targets as compared to the typical static network without the FRVM
mechanism.
93
Chapter 3. Flexible Random Virtual IP Multiplexing


















































Figure 3.7: Attacker success probability to discover the vulnerable host(s): (a)
using FRVM for the range of private IP addresses of class A, B, and C; and
(b) multiple targets in a network w/ FRVM and w/o FRVM.
3.6 Overhead Analysis
In this section, an investigation on the performance overheads (e.g., end-
to-end delay, throughput) of the deploying MTD mechanism (e.g., FRVM)
in SDN-based networked systems is presented. Also, we analyzed the flow
management requirements (e.g., flow-table size, update rate) of the FRVM
controller.
3.6.1 End-to-End Delay
In FRVM, an SDN controller (i.e., FRVM controller) handles all the
incoming packets from the OF switches. In every multiplexing interval, it
generates vIPs, maps rIPs-to-vIP, installs flow rules, DNS queries/updates,
and updates the flow-table entries in OF-switches. The FRVM controller
makes flow rules updates on the flow table of the SDN switch parallel via
OFPT FLOW MOD operations. However, it increases the end-to-end delay as
compared to the static network (i.e., typical SDN w/o FRVM). This additional
end-to-end delay incurs due to the deploying MTD (e.g., FRVM) is called
overhead delay. It is denoted by τ . We introduce a metric called overhead
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delay percentage in order to know the quantity of overhead incurred due to the






where Dmtd, and Dstatic denote the end-to-end delay of the network with MTD
and without MTD mechanism, respectively. Fig. 3.9a shows the experimental
testbed results of end-to-end delay for the network with the FRVM controller
(i.e., w/ FRVM) and typical static SDN controller (i.e., w/o FRVM). The
results show that the network deploying FRVM adds 0.00134ms delay and
∆ = 8.8%. This overhead (∆) can be reduced by increasing the MTD
shuffling (i.e., FRVM’s multiplexing) interval time and vice-versa. Therefore,
we further investigated the overhead delay for different MTD time intervals
with other parameters. Fig. 3.8 shows how the Packet-in message flow in
Figure 3.8: Packet-in message flow operations in a network with FRVM
controller.
software-defined network with FRVM controller. The FRVM’s operations such
as DNS queries/updates, virtual address generation and mapping and Flow-
table updates cause delay per MTD interval. Similarly, the operations such
as address translation (rIP-to-vIP/vIP-to-rIP) and packet header modification
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incurs delay in every packet. We define the following parameters for
representing the delays incur for the different FRVM’s operations.
• α: delay caused for DNS updates and IP address mapping operations at
the SDN controller.
• β: delay incurred for updating the flow-table operation at the OpenFlow
switch.
• γ: delay caused for address translations (i.e. ,vIP-to-rIP/rIP-to-vIP) and;
and packet modification operations. These operations are performed at
the end switches.
• λ: packet arrival per second.
The delay incurred in every MTD interval time with T , and in every packet




respectively. The overhead delay due to the
deploying of the FRVM is a sum of these two delays, and it can be computed








Fig 3.10 depicts the results of the sensitivity analysis of the overhead delay
incurs due to the deployment of the FRVM with varying MTD interval time and
packets arrival rate. Fig. 3.10(a) shows the overhead delay of the FRVM varying
MTD interval time (i.e., multiplexing interval time) for different packets arrival
rate. The results show that the delay substantially reduces as MTD interval
time and packet arrival rate increase. Fig 3.10(b) shows that the overhead
significantly decreases as increasing packets arrival rate. However, it noticeably
increases with decreasing the MTD interval time (i.e., increasing multiplexing
frequency). With high multiplexing frequency (i.e., low MTD interval) and low
packet arrival rate significantly increase the overhead delay of the FRVM. It
can be reduced, reducing multiplexing frequency and increasing packets arrival
rate. However, there is a trade-off between security and performance.
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Figure 3.9: Performance overhead of FRVM controller with a typical static
SDN controller.
3.6.2 Throughput
The throughput of the network with FRVM and without FRVM was
measured using the duration of file transfers over TCP. The duration of the
file transfer was recorded by each of the outside users downloading a 100MB
file from protected servers. The file transfer measurements were taken on the
virtualized network described in Section 3.5.1. For the transfer, hosts inside of
the network acted as servers and outside hosts acted as clients. The bandwidth
of simulated links was restricted to 100Mb/s and 10Mb/s for links within the
network and links connecting to the network, respectively. Additionally, the
network performance of FRVM controller (i.e., w/ FRVM) is compared with
the typical SDN controller (i.e., w/o FRVM).
Let Ω denotes overhead throughput percentage of the network deploying
MTD (i.e., w/ FRVM controller) with respect to the baseline typical SDN





Where TPmtd and TPstatic represent the throughput of the network w/ FRVM
and w/o FRVM respectively. Fig 3.9b shows the throughput measured for the
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network w/ FRVM and w/o FRVM. Using these throughput results such as
TPmtd = 7881.773Kb/s and TPstatic = 8124.302Kb/s in Eq.(3.14), we obtained
Ω = 2.98%. This shows that deploying the FRVM controller into the SDN
network adds only 2.98% overhead.



















λ = 50 packets/s
λ = 100 packets/s
λ = 200 packets/s
λ = 500 packets/s
(a) Varying T with different λ
























(b) Varying λ with different T
Figure 3.10: Analysis of performance overhead of deploying the FRVM with
α = 5.0ms, β = 0.023ms, and γ = 1.0ms.

























(a) Varying ρ with different session durations (ω)



























(b) Varying T for different ω with ρ = 100.
Figure 3.11: Analysis of the flow management requirements for deploying
FRVM in a network with n = 5, and m = 5.
3.6.3 Flow Table-Size & Update Rate
Flow table size: In a network deploying FRVM, the flow-rules are specified
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for each TCP/UDP session, and two flow entries must be specified for each
pair of communicating hosts since the source and destination IP (=vIP) and
TCP/UDP ports must be specified. The number of flow-rules in a flow-table
of an OpenFlow switch (e.g., Open vSwitch [124]) depend on the number of a
host connected with, and the number of active services running on each host.
For instance, if a network has n-hosts are connected via an OpenFlow switch
and each of the host offering m-active services, the number of flow-entries at
the flow-table of the OpenFlow switch are n ×m and the length of the flow-
table growth with O(mn). According to the Little’s law in queueing theory,
if a network has n-hosts which are connected via an OpenFlow switch, each
host has on average m-number of active services with ρ-sessions per second,
and each session on average takes ω-seconds to terminate, then mean length of
flow-table (i.e., average no. of flow-rules) at the OpenFlow switch is denoted
by ζ and computed using Eq. (3.15).
ζ = n×m× ρ× ω (3.15)
Fig. 3.11(a) shows the average flow-table length requirements of an OpenFlow
switch in a network deploying FRVM controller with 5-hosts, where each host
has 5-active services for various session establishments rate and duration. The
results show that the length of the flow-table linearly grows as session rate and
duration grow.
Flow update rate: In FRVM, the flow-rules are modified and then
updated the flow-table in every multiplexing interval time, T . If θ = 1
T
denotes
an average multiplexing rate per second, then FRVM modifies the flow-rules
at θ rate. Let µ denotes an average flow update rate of the FRVM controller,
and it can be estimated multiplying an average number of flow-rules, which is
mean length of flow-table (i.e., obtained from Eq. (3.15)) by the multiplexing
rate. It is given by:
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Fig. 3.11(b) shows the results of the flow update rate requirements for FRVM
controller varying MTD interval time (T ) with different session duration.
The results show that the flow-table update rate significantly decreases an
increase of MTD interval time. The length of the session duration negatively
impacts the flow-table update rate of the FRVM controller for the high
multiplexing frequency and vice-versa. These results show that our FRVM’s
flow management requirements (i.e.,flow-table size and the flow update rate)
are acceptable and feasible with shorter session duration and rate for deploying
on SDN-based network infrastructure using the software kernel switches such
as Open vSwitch (OVS) [124] which allows 200,000 flow entries [125] with flow-
update rate of 42,000 rules per seconds [89].
3.7 Summary
This chapter presented a novel SDN-based proactive and dynamic
security defense mechanism as an MTD technique to deal with the network
reconnaissance and scanning attacks. The proposed MTD technique is deployed
in the SDN-based environment by developing a customized SDN controller
called FRVM controller and validated its performance against a typical static
SDN controller counterpart. The experimental results proved that the FRVM
could effectively thwart scanning attacks increasing the attacker’s work effort
with acceptable operational overhead.
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Random Host and Service
Multiplexing
This chapter proposes a proactive SDN-based MTD mechanism called
Random Host and Service Multiplexing (RHSM), which obfuscates the real
identities of both hosts and their services (e.g., IP addresses and TCP/UDP
Ports). RHSM apples the virtual IP multiplexing (i.e., FRVM) concept
introduced in Chapter 3 of this thesis to both hosts and services multiplexing of
both servers and client systems in a network. The concept of the RHSM security
defense mechanism is introduced in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 and Section 4.3
describe the system and attacker models considered in this work respectively.
The proposed RHSM approach with system architecture, IP and ports mapping
algorithms, and communication protocols are presented in Section 4.4. The
simulation experiments and evaluation of the proposed RHSM are discussed in
Section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarizes the work presented in this chapter.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• Propose a novel SDN-based MTD approach that obfuscates real identities
of both hosts and services and provides secure communications between
the end systems;
• Design an SDN-based architecture, algorithms, and communication
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protocols that enable the more effective realization of the proposed RHSM
on the testbed;
• Analyze the performance of the RHSM against network reconnaissance
and scanning attacks in terms of attacker success probability to discover
the hosts and services for the address space size and the vulnerable
services;
• Investigate the overhead derived from operating RHSM in terms of the
size of the flow table, the frequency of flow rules modifications, and the
performance of an SDN controller.
4.1 Introduction
The static nature of conventional networked systems has provided
advantages for attackers to efficiently launch attacks and accordingly achieve
their attack success while it makes a defender hard to defend against these
attacks. Attackers often have asymmetric advantages by taking ample time
to monitor a target system, gain the intelligence towards the target system’s
configurations, identify exploitable vulnerabilities on it, and finally select a
time and place to maximize the benefit of launching the attack. To mitigate
the high benefits of the attackers, the concept of MTD has been introduced as a
proactive defense mechanism to prevent cyberattacks by dynamically changing
attack surface to increase an attacker’s confusion or uncertainty towards the
target systems (or networks) [57]. Hong and Kim [64] categorized the MTD
techniques into three classes: shuffling, diversity, and redundancy. Shuffling-
based MTD employs rearrangements and/or randomization of system/network
configurations in various ways, such as changing instruction set, address space
layout, IP address, MAC address, port number, and/or route [3, 10, 74,
73, 79, 99, 103, 139]. The existing techniques using IP address shuffling
[85, 3, 10, 76] and port hopping [93, 99, 143] used the random mutation
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of IP addresses and port numbers and mapped in a one-to-one manner,
respectively. Also, they are often deployed in conventional networks. However,
the existing approaches are known to lack of using both the IP address and
the port numbers as a single solution for software-defined networking (SDN)
environments. The key benefit of using the SDN technology is to separately
manage the control panel from forwarding functions, which allows a network to
achieve both direct programmability (i.e., high controllability) and abstraction
of the underlying infrastructure for the secure deployment of applications and
network services [88, 136]. This merit of the SDN can provide a way of efficient
and practical designs of dynamic and adaptive MTD techniques compared to
other network environments.
In this chapter, we propose Random Host and Service Multiplexing (RHSM)
as a novel MTD technique to be deployed in an SDN environment to obfuscate
the real identities of both hosts and their services (e.g., IP and Ports) during
communications. Each server host (i.e., end/server-host) is assigned an IP
address, called a real IP (rIP) address. A server-host can have one or more
active services while each active service has a TCP/UDP port number, called a
real port (rPort) number. RHSM enables a server-host and service running on
it to have random, multiple IP addresses and port numbers that keep changing
over time. They are called virtual IP (vIP) addresses and virtual port (vPort)
numbers, respectively. These short-lived vIPs and vPorts of the server-host
are multiplexed (i.e., mapped) to an rIP and rPort in an N -to-1 manner in
multiplexing and a 1-to-N manner in de-multiplexing, respectively. The vIPs
and vPorts of the server-host are frequently and randomly changed to prevent
attackers from capturing the patterns of IP addresses being changed by the
system. This SDN-based MTD solution is mainly designed to handle scanning
attacks (i.e., network reconnaissance).
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4.2 System Model
We consider an SDN-based system model to deploy the proposed MTD
technique where the SDN consists of end hosts, OF switches, and an SDN
controller. The end hosts are further divided into two types: client hosts and
server hosts. A server-host provides multiple services to client-hosts (i.e., end-
users) where at least one service is active. Each service a server-host provides
has its ID in terms of the corresponding port number. A client-host can access
any active services offered by the server using the server host’s IP address and
port number. We describe our system model in Fig. 4.1 in terms of the control
plane with an SDN controller (e.g., OpenDaylight [108]) and the data plane
consisting of OF switches and end hosts, including client and server hosts.
4.3 Attacker Model
An attacker is assumed to exist outside the system model. The attacker uses
a random scanning strategy and monitors the network (i.e., reconnaissance)
while a defense system aims to hide real IDs, such as real IP addresses and
port numbers. The attacker tries to discover a target host, scans the target
host, exploits its vulnerabilities, and then finally compromise the target host.
An attacker is assumed to have a certain level of intelligence and/or information
towards a target system and the system’s defense mechanisms in place. Hence,
we make the following assumptions:
• There are N total IP addresses (i.e., IP address space), m total port
addresses (i.e., port address space, m ≤ 216) available, and n total server-
hosts exist in the network (i.e., n ≤ N);
• Each of the server-host is assigned to a rIP address that has mapped to
one or more vIP addresses;
• Each server-host has v-active services (i.e., 1 ≤ v ≤ m);
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• An attacker targets to discover a server-host and its active services;
• The attacker is aware of the address space (i.e., N and m) and will
sequentially attempt k probes/scans to find a target host’s IP address
and ports; and
• The attacker can use a scanning tool (e.g., Nmap [101]) to identify both
server hosts and services (i.e., ports) actively running on the target server
hosts.
4.4 Proposed Approach
In this section, we describe our proposed RHSM approach. The RHSM is an
SDN-based proactive MTD technique designed to provide network obfuscation
based on the random mapping of rIP-to-vIP(s) address and rPort-to-vPort(s)
of server-host(s) and vice-versa.
4.4.1 Architecture
The RHSM system architecture consists of four main components: an SDN-
controller, OpenFlow (OF) switches, proxies, and end-hosts (e.g., server-hosts
& client-hosts). The client-hosts and server-hosts are end hosts while the OF-
switches in the data plane connect the end hosts. Fig. 4.1 depicts the system
architecture used by our proposed RHSM. Each component of the system
architecture is described below.
End-host(s): End hosts include a set of servers, workstations, and gateway
interface to routers. Each end-host is assigned with an rIP address where the
rIP is mapped to a short-lived vIP address. A server-host can provide multiple
active services with port numbers (i.e., TCP/UDP ports). The client-host can
send a request to access the services provided by the server host.
An SDN Controller: An SDN-controller is the core of an SDN. All the
communications between end hosts have to go through the SDN controller,
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Figure 4.1: System architecture of RHSM.
which installs necessary flows on the OF switches and makes flow table updates.
We extend the SDN controller’s functionalities to implement the RHSM to
provide the multiplexing of IP addresses and ports using the mapping, as
in Algorithm 2. We can implement this algorithm by choosing any one of
the existing SDN controllers (e.g., Ryu [133],OpenDaylight [108], ONTO [19]).
Table 4.2 shows an example demonstrating how the SDN controller conducts
the mapping for the vIPs-to-rIP and vPorts-to-rPort, and vice-versa; and how
vIPs and vPorts are dynamically changed based on a time interval. The SDN
controller has the following key roles:
• It generates random vIP addresses and vPort numbers for the server-host’s
rIP and rPort;
• It performs the mapping of rIP-to-vIPs of IP addresses and rPort-to-vPorts
of ports, and assigned them to the servers;
• It dynamically changes the vIPs and the vPorts based on the corresponding
intervals, T vIPi and T
vPort
j respectively; and
• It updates the flow table of OF switches and lookup (mapping) tables of the
proxies.
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Algorithm 2: RHSM Algorithm for the SDN Controller
1 for all packets p from host hi to hj do
2 if hi’s access to hj is authorized then
3 if p is a packet to set up a new connection then
4 map rIPhj -to-vIPhj , and rPort-to-vPort;
5 send vIP and vPort to host hi, and update lookup-table of hj ;





11 for multiplexing intervals, T vIPi of each host and T
vPort
j of each service do
12 generate new vIP and vPort;
13 update the lookup table(s) in proxies;
14 update the flow table(s) of OF-switch(es);
15 end
16 end
Table 4.1: An instance of flow table entries of an OF-switch.






* * IP1 10.0.0.1 * 9906 PORT1
* * IP2 10.0.0.10 * 7889 PORT2
* * IP3 10.0.0.15 * 8779 PORT3
OF-switches: An SDN consists of a set of interconnected OF-switches
(e.g., Open vSwitch [125]). Each OF switch forwards the data plane traffics
based on the flow rule specified by the SDN controller. An OF protocol
provides an interface for the communications between the OF-switches and
the controllers [107]. At every multiplexing interval time, the SDN controller
updates the flow rules of the OF-switches using the OF protocol. Table 4.1
depicts the flow table entries of an OF-switch of the SDN system deploying the
RHSM defense mechanism.
RHSM proxy: Each end host of the RHSM-adapted network is installed
with an RHSM proxy. The RHSM proxy performs the translation and
replacement of IP and ports for ingress and egress packets’ headers. It performs
vIP-to-rIP and vPort-to-rPort translation for incoming packets. Similarly, it
performs the translation of rIP-to-vIP and rPort-to-vPort for the outgoing
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Algorithm 3: Host and Service De/Multiplexing Algorithm for the
RHSM Proxies
1 for all egress packets p from host hi to host hj do
2 if p is a packet to setup a new connection then
3 randomly generate new vIP for host hi and new vPort for a service;
4 store rIPhi-to-vIPhi and rPort-to-vPort mapping in lookup table;
5 set p.srcIP := vIP and p.srcPort := vPort;
6 else
7 find vIP and vPort of host hi in the lookup table;
8 set p.srcIP := vIP and p.srcPort := vPort;
9 end
10 send secure message(s) to the SDN-controller for vIP and vPort of
destination host hj ;
11 store rIPhj -to-vIPhj and rPort-to-vPort mapping in the lookup tables;
12 set p.dstIP := vIP and p.dstPort := vPort;
13 send packet p with vIP and vPort to the OF-switch;
14 end
15 for all ingress packets p from host hi to host hj do
16 multiplex vIPhj (s)-to-rIPhj ,vPort(s)-to-rPort using the lookup table;
17 deliver packet p to rIPhj : rPort of hj ;
18 end
Table 4.2: An example of n − to − 1/1 − to − n multiplexing of server-host’s
virtual IPs and services’ virtual ports.
(a) A state at time t0








rIP3 10.0.0.50 9995 443




(b) A state at time t1








rIP3 10.0.10.5 4445 443




packets. This mapping of IP and port of the end hosts is described in
Algorithm 3. The RHSM proxies are implemented in both client and server
host’s end systems of the network.
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4.4.2 Host Multiplexing
Server-host’s vIP multiplexing: This defense mechanism obfuscates the
server-host’s rIP while communicating with replacing the rIP with a random
short-lived vIP in a packet header before transmitting to the network while
vIPs are changed with a certain time interval, T vIPi . Fig. 4.2a shows the
abstraction of how hosts’ vIPs are multiplexed and de-multiplexed in the
communicating end hosts. The vIP addresses for server-hosts are generated
using the cryptographically secured random number generator for the address
space range of the server-host. The mapping rIP-to-vIP/vIP-to-rIP can be
performed at proxies on the server-host or client-host. Algorithm 3 describes
the translation process of both vIPs-to-rIP and vPorts-to-rPort and vice-versa,
respectively. The mapping is performed transparently to end users without
disrupting services since rIPs and rPorts of a server-host are not changed.
Client-host’ vIPs multiplexing: The client host’s IP multiplexing is
performed in order to hide its real ID (rIP) in the network and mapping the
multiple vIP addresses to an rIP of the client. The vIP replaces the rIP of the
client and then sends the packet to the network. These clients’ vIPs are valid
per session. The client-host also uses the proxy to perform the translations of
real and virtual IPs and ports with rewriting the packet header.
4.4.3 Service Multiplexing
The service multiplexing is a defense mechanism to hide the actual
port numbers (i.e., rPorts) of the running services of a server-host with
de/multiplexing of a service’s rPort to the multiple vPorts. Each rPort of
a server-host can be mapped to a set of short-lived, random vPorts, which
are changed constantly based on a certain time interval, T vPortj . Therefore, an
active service running on a server-host can have multiple, virtual port numbers,
vPort, and the multiplexing operation can be mapped (i.e., multiplexed), such
as multiple vPorts numbers to a single actual port (i.e., rPort) number of
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(a) Host Multiplexing: 3-virtual IPs of the host are multiplexed to a real IP.
(b) Service Multiplexing: 3-virtual ports of service are multiplexed to a real
port.
Figure 4.2: Host and service multiplexing operations in RHSM.
the active service. Fig. 4.2b shows how the vPorts are multiplexed and de-
multiplexed on the communication processes of end hosts. In this work, the
SDN controller performs this operation with the host multiplexing operation
for each connection and synchronized in the mapping table of the end hosts.
Algorithm 2 describes the procedure for multiplexing of vIPs to rIP, and vPorts
to rPort on the SDN-controller, respectively.
4.4.4 Communication Protocols
The communication mechanisms of RHSM are similar to that of our
previous work [139] (i.e., presented in Chapter 3) in which the ordinary
users (e.g., clients) communicate using domain-name (i.e., host-name) and,
the authorized users (e.g., administrators) communicate using the rIPs of the
server-hosts. The SDN controller installs and modifies the necessary flow-rules
of the switches. The client is assumed to be authorized per connection. With
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Figure 4.3: Sequence of the communication message flow from a client-host to
a server-host using a domain-name.
Figure 4.4: Sequence of the communication message flow from a client-host to
a server-host using a real IP.
RHSM, vIPs are only used for routing while rIPs and rPorts are instead hidden
within the network. The translation of virtual-to-real address (e.g., vIP-to-rIP
and vPort-to-rPort) is performed before delivering the packets at the proxies.
Figs. 4.3 and 4.4 show the sequence of the flow of messages from a client-host to
a server-host in system with RHSM defense mechanism using a domain-name
(or host-name) and rIP, respectively.
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4.5 Experimental Results and Analysis
In this section, we demonstrate the experimental results that compare
the performance of the RHSM and a baseline model with a static network.
We investigate the impact of scanning attacks in terms of attacker success
probability and the defense cost generated.
4.5.1 Comparing Network Environments
A static network is considered as a baseline network to be compared
against the proposed RHSM, where the network uses a static network
configuration with static IP address and ports assigned to a server-host. The
Attacker Success Probability (ASP) to discover at least one server-host or one
service running on it in an SDN-based static network with n-hosts, v-vulnerable
services, N -virtual IP address size, and m-port address size in k-scans can be








) , ASPs = 1− (m−vk )(m
k
) (4.1)
where k ≥ 1, N ≥ n and m ≥ v.
A dynamic network with RHSM remaps all vIPs and vPorts of the
server-host periodically based on intervals, T vIPi and T
vPort
j , respectively. We
assume that it remaps all the vIPs addresses and vPorts numbers of server-hosts
per scanning attempt. An attacker loses any reconnaissance knowledge gained
upon every multiplexing event. The ASP to discover at least a server-host or
service in an SDN-based network with RHSM scheme is obtained, respectively,
by [23, 139]:
ASP rhsmh = 1− (1−
n
N





Chapter 4. Random Host and Service Multiplexing



























Address size N = 216
Address size N = 220
Address size N = 224
(a) ASP to discover a server-host with address size of all
private IP addresses of IPv4


































(b) ASP under RHSM vs. a static network.
Figure 4.5: Attacker success probability of RHSM versus a static network under
a different attack intensity.
4.5.2 Experimental Setup
We validate the outperformance of the RHSM, compared to the baseline
static network, in terms of ASP and the size of the flow table (i.e., defense cost
introduced by the MTD). Recall that the attacker aims to launch scanning
attacks while the defense system keeps real IP addresses and port numbers
hidden to obfuscate the real IDs of the system components. Hence, the attacker
will use a random, virtual IP address or a random, virtual port number in order
to identify a target server-host or an active service, respectively. The ASP to
discover the target host or the target service is obtained based on Eqs. (4.1)
and (4.2) for both the static network and the dynamic network with RHSM,
respectively.
4.5.3 Attacker Success Probability Analysis
ASP to discover a server-host: Fig. 4.5a shows the effect of discovering
a server-host on ASP under varying the number of scans. In Fig. 4.5a, we
investigated how RHSM outperforms the baseline model when the attacker
attempts to find a vIP ranging for IPv4 Class-A (i.e., 10.0.0.0/8), Class-B (i.e.,
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172.16.0.0/12), and Class-C (i.e., 192.168.0.0/16) under varying the number
of scans. As shown in Fig. 4.5a, ASP reaches 0.63 when the attackers scan
all the private IPs of Class-C (i.e., 216 = 65, 536). This implies that more
effort is needed for the attacker to discover the host’s IP as the address space
increases from IP class C to B. Also, much more effort is needed for the
attacker to reach its success from IP class B to class-A. Since the nature of
MTD is proactive, we normally do not allow the attacker time to scan the
whole network. However, we show this worst-case result for the purpose of
demonstrating the outperformance of the RHSM.
ASP to discover services in a server-host: Fig. 4.5b shows the
comparative security analysis with respect to ASP to discover vulnerable
services in a server-host under a static network vs. a dynamic network with
RHSM. We computed the ASP to discover the service in a server-host when
the number of vulnerable services varies. In Fig. 4.5b, ASP linearly increments
proportional to the number of scans. Under the static network without RHSM,
100% of port scanning attack (216 = 65, 536) makes 100% of attack success
(i.e., ASP = 1). On the other hand, under the dynamic network with RHSM,
the magnitude of increasing ASP is significantly slowed down even when the
attacker scans the whole port address space. Similarly, Fig. 4.5b shows ASP to
discover target services in a server-host with a different number of vulnerable
services, such as v = 1, 3, and 5. As expected, a higher ASP is observed under
more vulnerable services. In particular, it is noticeable that the ASP is highly
sensitive to the increase of vulnerable services, showing exponential growth with
v = 3, 5, while showing a linear growth with v = 1. In conclusion, the effect
of service multiplexing is more pronounced under a smaller number of services
vulnerable (i.e., v ≤ 5). Otherwise, more frequent multiplexing needs to be
executed while balancing the overhead incurred by the multiplexing operations.
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(a) Flow-table size































(b) Flow-rules update rate
Figure 4.6: Overhead of deploying RHSM on an SDN-based environment.
4.5.4 Overhead Analysis
We use an SDN controller to make a flow entry in the flow table for each
host it communicates with, but the end of each session does not change the
installed flow rules. The size of a flow table linearly increases in proportion to
the number of hosts. Under RHSM, since a host’s virtual IP addresses and an
active service’s port number keep being changed, the SDN controller needs to
maintain multiple flow entries and accordingly updates the installed flow rules
for each host. Further, since the IP/port multiplexing is performed periodically,
a shorter MTD interval leads to more frequent modifications of the flow rules
for each host.
The size of a flow table (Nf ): For n hosts with each having v-vulnerable
services, Nf increases as both hosts and services increase with O(nv). Fig. 4.6a
shows that Nf grows as n increases under varying v. This proves that Nf
linearly grows as n and v grow.
The frequency of flow rules modifications (Nr): Let θ = 1/T denote
an average multiplexing rate in RHSM. Given T = T vIPi = T
vPort
j , RHSM
modifies θ times of flow rules per second, leading to Nr = O(nvθ). In Fig. 4.6b,
given a fixed v = 5 running on each server-host, we varied the time interval
of multiplexing (e.g., T = 5, 15, 30, 60 sec.) with varying n in x-axis. Shorter
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T (e.g., 5 sec.) significantly introduces high overhead showing higher Nr, and
vice-versa.
The performance of an SDN controller: Under RHSM, an SDN
controller delegates a server program to make the updates on proxies of the end
systems via a north-bound interface (i.e., NB-API) in the SDN. The controller
makes flow rules updates on the flow table of the SDN switch parallel via
OFPT FLOW MOD operations. Therefore, the overhead of the SDN controller
is negligible. Also, there is no cost of address translations to the SDN controller
because the end hosts perform the multiplexing/de-multiplexing of vIPs-rIP
and vPorts-rPort on their RHSM proxies.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presented a novel proactive, dynamic SDN-based MTD
called RHSM that randomizes hosts (e.g., IP addresses) and services (e.g.,
port numbers) by employing a multiplexing (or de-multiplexing) technique
to confuse attackers and accordingly increases their attack complexity by
leveraging the controllability offered by the SDN technology. For the validation
of the outperformance of the RHSM, we conducted performance analysis by
comparing the RHSM with a baseline model with a static network configuration
(i.e., without using RHSM) with respect to the ASP. We analyzed the effect
of port address space scanned by attackers under varying a different number
of service vulnerabilities. Our results proved that the proposed RHSM could
effectively thwart scanning attacks and provide a proactive and resilient security
solution by effectively hiding the real identities of both a server-host and its
active service in SDN environments. The experimental results proved that
RHSM outperformed its static counterpart in terms of the decreased attacker
success probability with small additional overhead. Our findings suggest that
the proposed RHSM should be deployed more opportunistically to meet the
conflicting goals of performance and security.
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Dynamic Security Metrics for
MTD
This chapter proposes a new suite of dynamic security metrics to measure
the effectiveness of MTD mechanisms in SDNs. The metrics are introduced in
Section 5.1. Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 describe the system and attacker
models considered in this work respectively. The proposed metrics are
presented in Section 5.4. The simulation experiments and results are discussed
in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 summarizes the work presented in this chapter.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• Propose a set of dynamic security metrics that can assess the effectiveness
of deployed SDN-based MTD techniques that can timely, dynamically,
and adaptively capture a network’s security state.
• Develop a comprehensive set of security metrics measuring dynamics in
terms of changes made by MTD in network addresses, network topology
(or attack paths/routes), and attack success by considering the multi-
staged attacks for discovering, exploiting, and compromising a target
host.
• Perform extensive simulation experiments to measure the effectiveness
of MTD techniques deployed in SDNs, identifying key factors that
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significantly influence the performance of MTD based on the proposed
security metrics.
5.1 Introduction
MTD is a game-changing cybersecurity strategy that creates uncertainty of
network configurations introducing higher hurdles for attackers [77]. The key
purpose of MTD is to change attack surface [106] to increase unpredictability for
attackers. The technology of software-defined networks (SDNs) has emerged
as a platform for MTD techniques to be efficiently and effectively deployed.
A variety of SDN-based MTD techniques have been developed [30, 81, 103]
as proactive and dynamic security solutions. Several assessment methods for
MTD techniques [64, 166, 176] have been proposed. However, their application
is limited to particular attack scenarios or models. For instance, a system risk
metric can be best suited to assess the effectiveness of virtual machine shuffling
MTD, but not for assessing the effectiveness of network and address shuffling
based MTD. Also, timeliness-based MTD frequently and periodically changes
a network’s configurations per time interval of T . This may miss capturing
a security state at T + 1 because the status check is performed every T time
units. In this regard, the existing security metrics do not fully capture the
dynamics of a network in terms of the changes made in the attack surface after
MTD being executed. In this chapter, we propose a new suite of dynamic
security metrics to measure the effectiveness of SDN-based MTD techniques
in which they can timely and adaptively capture dynamic security states of
the network over time. These metrics estimate variability to keep track of
the changing patterns of network configurations or status (e.g., IP addresses,
services, paths, connectivity, vulnerabilities) per MTD interval.
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5.2 System Model
In this work, we consider the SDN-based system model. The SDN-based
networked system consists of end hosts, SDN switches (i.e., OF-switches),
and SDN-controller (e.g., Ryu [133]) which are communicating over a secure
channel via an open-flow (OF) protocol [107]. The SDN technology decouples
a network control plane with a data-forwarding plane in order to provide
high flexibility and programmability [136], which can effectively abstract the
underlying infrastructure for high applicability and service provision [88]. The
programmable interfaces afforded by the SDN can be comforted to deploy and
analyze MTD techniques. The SDN controller implements the MTD technique
extending its functionalities and controls in a centralized manner [81, 139]. An
example network based on this system model is presented in Fig 5.1.
Figure 5.1: An example of the SDN-based network environment for deploying
the MTD mechanism.
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5.3 Attacker Model
In this work, we devise a three-stage attack model based on Cyber Kill
Chain (CKC) model [70], consisting of the following three phases:
1. Discovery is a reconnaissance phase involving the identification or
selection of potential victim targets (e.g., hosts or services) and the
collection of the security-related information (e.g., vulnerabilities or
reachability) via scanning on the target system.
2. Exploitation is a phase of the attacker attempting to exploit applications
or operating system vulnerabilities (e.g., cross-site scripting or remote
code execution) of the target system.
3. Attack is a phase after the previous two phases are successfully performed.
Hence, in this phase, the attacker launches an attack to compromise the
target system.
The attacker is assumed to have a certain level of knowledge towards a target
system and its defense capability as:
• The attacker is aware of the network address space and performs
reconnaissance on targeted network adapting random scanning strategy.
• The attacker is located outside the network (i.e., outside attackers).
• The attacker assumes each host has at least one vulnerability and can
exploit it.
• Exploiting a host’s vulnerability means granting the root privilege of the
host.
• The attacker uses scanning tools (e.g., Nmap [101] or Nessus [111]) to
discover all hosts and vulnerabilities on the targeted network.
• Each attacker is aware of an MTD technique running on the target
network by shuffling IP and network addresses.
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5.4 Proposed Metrics
In this section, we describe our proposed security metrics aiming to
effectively capture the dynamics introduced by an SDN-based MTD that can
enhance system security. These metrics are capable of capturing the dynamics
of the network state information over time. The network state information
comprises host or network configuration information (e.g., IP addresses,
TCP/UDP ports, OS, vulnerabilities, network reachability-paths, or routes).
These metrics compute variability that keeps track of changing patterns (i.e.,
variations) on the configuration information based on the observations of the
network’s states over time. We categorize our metrics into three classes (i.e.,
address-based, path-based, and attack stage-based) based on the information
used or attack model consideration.
5.4.1 Network and Host Address-based Metrics
In this section, we propose two networks address information-based security
metrics: network address variability (NAV) and host address variability (HAV)
to assess the effectiveness of MTD. These metrics compute the changing pattern
of the IP addresses over time.
5.4.1.1 Network address variability (NAV)
This measures the change in the network (IP) addresses over time. A set
of currently used IP addresses of the hosts in the network at time tk is defined
by NStk = {hi.IPtk | hi.IPtk is a currently used IP of hi ∈ H}. An IP-shuffling
MTD technique constantly changes the IP addresses of the hosts in every T
time interval (i.e., sec.). This dynamic changes of the IP addresses can be
captured by the network states (i.e., NStk) at a different time point (i.e., tk).
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where “−” is the set difference operations and “| · |” is the cardinality of
the set. Eq. (5.1) is the number of address changes on NStk normalized
by its size. NAVtk is estimated based on how the network state changing
over time and rangeed in [0, 1]. For instance, if the network state remains
unchanged, NStk − NStk−1 = φ holds then NAVtk = 0; if it has partially
changed, NStk − NStk−1 ⊂ NStk holds then 0 < NAVtk < 1; and if it has
completely changed, NStk − NStk−1 = NStk holds then NAVtk = 1. The







Based on Eq. (5.1), we can easily infer the NAV based on two consecutive
observable network states for the given duration [t1, tm]. We can compute the
NAV for multiple observable network states by finding the union of a current
set of network states (NStk) and a set of all previous network states (i.e.,





Like NAVtk , NAV
U
tk
∈ [0, 1], indicating 0 for low variability and 1 for high
variability.
5.4.1.2 Host address variability (HAV)
NAV measures how the deployed MTD creates the address diversity in
a network, representing address variability at a network-level rather than at
a host-level. Therefore, to measure the host-level variability, we devise a
metric measuring the changing pattern of IP addresses assigned to each host
individually over time. Given HStk , a set of currently used IP address(es) of
the host in the network at time tk, the variability of each host’s address at tk
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Similar to NAV Utk , we can compute HAV
U
tk
representing the variability of






Both NAV and HAV are in the range of [0, 1], where higher values indicate
higher variabilities introduced by MTD.
5.4.2 Path-based Metrics
In this section, we propose path-based security metrics that measure MTD
effectiveness in creating uncertainty on attack paths when shuffling IP addresses
or network topology (e.g., connecting/disconnecting links between hosts).
These dynamic network changes affect hosts’ reachability and accordingly
change attack paths. We use the Temporal Hierarchical Attack Representation
Model (T-HARM) [47] to capture the changes of attack paths. T-HARM is a
two-layer security model that captures a host’s temporal reachability on the
upper layer and vulnerability at the lower layer using the attack graph (AG)
and the set of attack trees (ATs), respectively.
5.4.2.1 Attack path variability (APV)
This metric measures the changes in attack paths to capture the effect of
deploying MTD. The MTD shuffling makes the network topology frequently
changed. We represent this dynamics of the network over time (i.e., at a
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Figure 5.2: Network graph with reachability and address information of the
example network: (a) at time t1, (b) at time t2, and (c) at time t3.
different time point tk) with AGtk and compute all possible attack paths in
every tk. For instance, Fig. 5.2 shows a network reachability graph, that can
derive attack paths, at three different time points (i.e., t1, t2, and t3). The set
of all possible attack paths at tk is described by:
APtk = {aptk | aptk ∈ AGtk} (5.7)
where aptk is an attack path from an attacker to a target at tk. Similar to the
computation of NAV in Eq. (5.1), we estimate the instantaneous APV at tk,











where APV is ranged as a real number in [0, 1].
We discuss how APV can be used in the example network (i.e.,Fig. 5.1)
based on Example 1 below. The network consists of 5-hosts (i.e., h1, h2, h3, h4,
and h5) where h5 is the target host. An attacker A is located outside the
network and attempts to attack the target host (i.e., h5) by discovering an
attack path and exploiting the vulnerabilities of those hosts on the attack
path. The deployed MTD mechanism shuffles the network topology to disrupt
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the attacker’s activities. This metric captures such dynamics introduced to the
network due to the MTD operations and computes variations in terms of attack
paths at different time points. Figs. 5.2 (a), (b), (c) show the representations of
the example network at t1, t2, t3, respectively. We compute all possible attack
paths and their variations over time.
Example 1. A set of all possible attack paths at time t1, APt1=
{(A, h1, h3, h5), (A, h1, h4, h5), (A, h2, h4, h5), (A, h2, h3, h5) }, at time t2, APt2=
{ (A, h1, h2, h4, h5), (A, h1, h2, h3, h5), (A, h2, h4, h5), (A, h2, h3, h5) }. APV









= 1.0. Now, we obtain APV on time window [t1, t3] (i.e., m = 3),
APV = 0.5+1.0
3−1 = 0.75. This shows that deploying MTD technique invalidates
75% of the attack paths on scanning time window [t1, t3].
5.4.2.2 Attack path variability with IP-shuffling (APVIS)
APV metric is designed to capture the impact of the dynamics introduced
to the network topology on attack paths due to network shuffling. APV does
not reflect the effect of IP-shuffling. To estimate the dynamics of the network
introduced by network address shuffling MTDs, we propose a metric called
APV with IP-shuffling, namely APVIS. This metric measures the impact of IP
shuffling MTD on attack paths based on the rationale that more IP changes
disrupt attackers more with high attack complexity. We compute the attack
path variability based on the changes made in an IP address of each host on
the path. We obtain a set of attack paths with IP-shuffling at tk by:
APIStk = {aptk | aptk ∈ AGtk} (5.10)
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We define a binary variable bitk to keep track of the IP changes of each host,
hi ∈ H, at two different time points tk and tk−1 by:
bitk =
1 if hi.IPtk 6= hi.IPtk−10 otherwise. (5.11)
The attack paths can be computed using bitk for each hi on ap
j
tk
∈ APIStk . hi
is denoted by h′i if its IP address has been changed (i.e., b
i
tk = 1). The APVIS











We show an example of using the metrics as below based on the network in
Fig. 5.1. In this example, both a network topology and host IP addresses are
changed by MTD.
Example 2. The computation of the set of all possible attack paths at
different time points t1, t2, and t3 with network and/or IP shuffling for the
example network represented in Fig 5.2 is based on Eq. (5.10) and Eq. (5.11).
APISt1= {(A, h1, h3, h5), (A, h1, h4, h5), (A, h2, h4, h5), (A, h2, h3, h5) };
APISt2= { (A, h′1, h2, h′4, h5), (A, h′1, h2, h3, h5), (A, h2, h′4, h5), (A, h2, h3,























5) }. Based on Eq. (5.12),
we obtain APVIS t2 =
3
4
= 0.75, and APVIS t3=
6
6
= 1.0. Therefore, APVIS on
time window [t1, t2] =
0.75+1.0
3−1 = 0.875. This indicates that the deployed MTD
technique disrupts the attacker by invalidating 87.5% of addresses and/or paths
information collected by the attacker during the time window [t1, t3].
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5.4.2.3 Shortest attack path variability (SAPV)
The shortest path is a common graphical security metric that represents
the length of the smallest attack paths from an attacker’s initial state to the
goal state. This metric estimates the changes on shortest attack paths over
time. A set of the shortest attack path at tk is estimated by:
SAPtk = {aptk | min
aptk∈APtk
|aptk |} (5.14)











Now we discuss how the SAPV metric is used in Example 3 for the network
graphs in Fig. 5.2. The computation of the SAPV is similar to that of the APV
metric. However, its calculation is based on the shortest attack paths which
are more potential attack paths chosen by the attacker.
Example 3. We have the shortest attack paths at t1, SAPt1 = {(A, h1, h3,
h5), (A, h1, h4, h5), (A, h2, h4, h5), (A, h2, h3, h5)}; at t2, SAPt2 = {(A, h2,




= 0.0; SAPVt3 =
2
2
= 1.0, The overall SAPV= 0+1
3−1 = 0.5.
SAPVt2 = 0.0 means there is no variation on SAP at time t2, implying that
shortest attack paths remain unchanged (i.e., all of the SAP at time t2 also
exist at time t1), so the attacker can reach the target host using the shortest
paths and perform attack on it. This shows that there is no effect on the SAP
of the deployed MTD at time t2. Similarly, SAPVt3 = 1.0 means a perfect
variation on the SAP at time t3 (i.e., none of the shortest attack paths at time
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t2 exist at time t3). SAV P = 0.5 indicates that the deployed MTD invalidated
50% of the shortest attack paths obtained during scanning time window [t1, t3].
5.4.2.4 Shortest attack path variability with IP-shuffling (SAPVIS)
The set of the shortest attack paths with IP-shuffling at tk is given by











Note that unlike APVIS, SAPVIS is computed based on the shortest attack
paths.
5.4.2.5 Variability of the number of attack paths (VNAP)
This metric refers to the number of attack paths for an attacker to reach
a target host. If the network topology is randomly shuffled per interval, it
changes the number of attack paths available. When more paths are available,
the attacker can have various alternatives to reach the target host. Therefore,
computing the variability of NAP per T time interval can be used to assess
the effectiveness of the MTD techniques over time. The NAP at tk can be
computed by:
NAP tk = |APtk | (5.19)
The VNAP at tk can be obtained as:
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where VNAP is ranged in [0, 1] as a real number where a smaller VNAP
(i.e., < 1) increases the number of attack paths available. How the VNAP
is computed in the example network is discussed in Example 4.
Example 4. Based on Eq. 5.19, we compute NAP at different time points,
t1, t2, and t3 using the network graph of the example network. We have, NAP t1
= |APt1 | = 4, NAP t2 = |APt2| = 4, NAP t3 = |APt3| = 6. Now, VNAP at t2,
V NAPt2 = min(
4
4
, 1) = 1.0; similarly, VNAP at t3, V NAPt3 = min(
4
6
, 1) = 0.66.
We obtain overall VNAP = 1.0+0.66
3−1 = 0.83. It means that there is a negative
impact of the MTD shuffling (i.e., the attacker can find more attack paths
available) since NAP remains unchanged at t2 (i.e., NAPt2 = 4, V NAPt2 = 1.0)
and it increases to 6 at time t3 (i.e., two more paths, NAPt3 = 6).
5.4.3 Attack Stage-based Success Metrics
In this section, we propose a set of security metrics that measure an
attacker’s success probability where the attacker performs a multi-staged attack
by discovering, exploiting, and finally compromising a target system.
5.4.3.1 Scan success probability (SSP)
An attacker’s SSP to discover hi’s information (i.e., hi ∈ H), such as IP,




(1− pj) , (5.22)
where pj is a success probability in each scan and r ≤ N . For a sufficiently large
N (i.e., N →∞) with equal probability in each scan (i.e., pj = p,∀j), the SSP
129
Chapter 5. Dynamic Security Metrics for MTD
in scanning all addresses (i.e., r = N) is SSPhi = 1−(1− 1N )
N = 1−e−1 ≈ 0.63.
5.4.3.2 Exploit success probability (ESP)
The ESP for the attacker to exploit hi ∈ H depends on whether hi’s
vulnerability is exploitable or not. Here we use the lower layer of the T-
HARM [47] (i.e., the dynamic attack trees (ATs) which have both the AND
and OR gates) to calculate the ESP. The detailed mapping of the gates and
constructions of the ATs can be found in [11]. The formula for the ESP, where









(1− p(vij)), ∀vij ∈ OR, vij ∈ hi .
(5.23)
where p(vij) is the probability to exploit hi’s vulnerability j, v
i
j in hi. The p(v
i
j)
is obtainable from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [39]’s







(0.6 × Impactij + 0.4 × Exploitabilityij − 1.5) × f(Impactij) and VSmax is the
maximum vulnerability score set to 10.
5.4.3.3 Compromise success probability (CSP)
The CSP is a likelihood of an attacker’s success in compromising a target
hi ∈ H of the targeted system. As discussed in our threat model in Section 5.3,
hi ∈ H is considered being attacked if the attacker successfully gathered all




j in hi). Therefore, CSP
towards hi is based on the product of SSPhi and ESPhi and is computed by
CSPhi = SSPhi × ESPhi . The overall CSP on an attack path ap
j
tk
∈ APtk is a











∈ APtk . (5.24)
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Table 5.1: Security and vulnerability information of the hosts in the example
network.
Host (hi) Vul. (v
i





1 CVE-2018-11349 6.8 0.68 0.25
h2 v
2
2 CVE-2018-1111 7.9 0.79 0.37
h3 v
3
3 CVE-2018-8304 7.1 0.71 0.50
h4 v
4
4 CVE-2018-2680 5.1 0.51 0.63
h5 v
5
5 CVE-2018-2579 4.3 0.43 0.67
The CSP on APtk can be maximum CSPapjtk
of all attack paths on APtk , which
is obtained by:





The above CSP estimation is based on scanning success (i.e., an attacker’s
effort), exploit success (i.e., vulnerabilities) and attack paths (i.e., network







Example 5 below shows how the proposed CSP is used in Fig. 5.1, given
a network’s host and reachability information in Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.2,
respectively.
Example 5. APt1 = {ap1t1 = (A, h1, h3, h5), ap
2
t1




(A, h2, h4, h5), ap
4
t1
= (A, h2, h3, h5)}. CSPap1t1 = (SSPh1 ×ESPh1)× (SSPh3 ×
ESPh3)×(SSPh5×ESPh5) = (0.68×0.25)×(0.71×0.5)×(0.43×0.67) = 0.017.
Similarly, CSPap2t1
= 0.015, CSPap3t1
= 0.026, and CSPap4t1
= 0.029. CSP to
attack host h5 at time t1 on attack paths APt1 , CSP t1 = 0.029. Similarly, the
CSP to attack h5 on APt2 and APt3 is 0.029, and 0.017, respectively. CSP with
scanning time window [t1, t3] is 0.075.
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5.5 Experimental Results & Analysis
In this section, we conducted simulation experiments for evaluating the
impact of key parameters on the proposed dynamic security metrics. The
obtained results are presented.
5.5.1 Experimental Setup
We created an initial network topology based on a random graph consisting
of a given number of hosts and randomly assigned an IP address. Each
host’s IP is dynamically and randomly changed per MTD time interval T
(= tk − tk−1). Similarly, we applied a network topology shuffling MTD by
randomly shuffling links (i.e., edges) in the network. The host’s information
(e.g., IP, vulnerabilities) or reachability information (e.g., paths, links) are
captured per T interval and their changes are measured based on a suite of the
proposed metrics. For sensitivity analysis, we varied the number of hosts, the
number of shuffling links, and the scan success rate with known vulnerabilities
on the hosts.
5.5.2 Results & Analysis
Evaluation based on NAV: Fig. 5.3 (a) presents the simulation results
using the NAV metric under varying the number of hosts over time. NAV shows
little fluctuation over T . Also, NAV is higher under a small-sized network
than that under a large-sized network due to a slim chance of overlapping two
network states under a small-sized network. NAV in a scanning time window
[0, 150] (in sec.) is 0.8 for n = 50, indicating that the IP-shuffling mechanism
invalidates 80% reconnaissance on scanning the network in the time window.
Fig. 5.3 (b) shows the effect of varying the number of hosts on NAV with respect
to different address sizes. Notice that NAV gradually decreases as the number
of hosts increases because the same number of addresses available needs to be
mapped to a larger number of hosts. However, NAV increases considerably as
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the size of the available address space (N) increases because higher N generates
more diverse addresses with a larger pool of the addresses available.




























































Figure 5.3: NAV measured with respect to (a) varying time for the different
the number of hosts (n) with T = 30s and N = 28; and (b) varying n with
different N .
Evaluation based on APV: Fig. 5.4 (a) shows the effect on the variability
of attack paths when varying the number of links swapping under a different
network size (n). APV jumps from 0 to 0.55 with n = 10 when swapping
two links (i.e., one swap); and APV increases sharply as the number of swaps
increases and reaches to 1 (i.e., 100% variability) in 10 swaps. Similarly, Fig. 5.4
(b) depicts the effect of % of links shuffled under a different network size, n, on
APV. When only a small % of links are shuffled, the number of attack paths
can change significantly, leading to a greater APV.
Evaluation based on CSP: Fig. 5.5 (a) investigates how the network size,
n, affects CSP under different SSP. CSP decreases gradually as n grows due to
decreasing ESP. Fig. 5.5 (b) examines the effect of varying n across different %
of successful scans. 0% successful scans indicate that an attacker is completely
unaware of any configurations towards a target system while 100% successful
scans imply an attacker being fully aware of the target system configurations,
respectively. CSP increases as more successful scans are performed but slightly
decreases as the network size increases because a larger network contributes
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Figure 5.4: APV measured under varying the number of hosts (n) in a network
with respect to (a) # of links shuffled; and (b) % of links shuffled.
to generating more attack paths requiring more efforts to identify/exploit
vulnerabilities, resulting in greater attack cost.


































































Figure 5.5: CSP measured with respect to (a) varying the number of hosts (n)
with different SSP; and (b) varying % of successful scans with different network
size (n).
Relationship between NAV and CSP: Figs. 5.6 (a) and (b) show NAV
and CSP under two network sizes (i.e., # of hosts, n, is set to 100 or 200),
respectively. From this result, we can clearly see the relationship between NAV
and CSP: Higher NAV is well aligned with lower CSP, strongly suggesting
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that higher network address variability introduced by shuffling-based MTD
can reduce the attack success probability more and vice-versa.


























































Figure 5.6: Relationship between NAV and CSP metrics.
5.6 Summary
This chapter presented a suite of dynamic security metrics for measuring
the effectiveness of MTD techniques that shuffle a network topology and IP
addresses. The metrics measuring the variability of network and host addresses
properly capture the degree of an attacker being disrupted by a deployed MTD
in identifying a targeted network and host’s information. The results showed
that higher variability can be achieved under networks with larger address
space size and smaller network size. Similarly, the attack path-based metrics
captured the dynamic change of a network due to MTD link shuffling and
measured how the MTD creates uncertainty on attack paths. Based on our
experimental results, we showed high path variability significantly decreases
attack success probability. The proposed attack stage-based success metrics
can be used to assess the MTD techniques when an attacker is in a various stage
of its attack. We devised CSP to capture an attacker compromising a target
host by considering both SSP and ESP along with attack path’s information.
We proved high CSP occurs with high SSP and ESP .
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Discussions and Future Work
The research presented in this thesis addresses all the research questions
outlined in Chapter 1 by developing flexible random virtual IP multiplexing
(e.g., FRVM), random host and service multiplexing (e.g., RHSM) as novel
proactive MTD approaches, and dynamic security metrics for measuring the
effectiveness of the deploying MTD mechanisms (e.g., MTD metrics) in SDNs.
However, several assumptions are considered, which limit the scope of the
work and require future research to increase the scope and impact of the
proposed approaches. In this chapter, we discuss the limitations of the proposed
approaches and point out possible future work.
6.1 Addressing the Research Questions
In this thesis, we use development of MTD mechanisms and security metrics
approach to answer the following research questions outlined in Chapter 1:
• Q1: How can we shuffle virtual IP addresses of server hosts in the SDN?
• Q2: How can we protect the SDN with the existence of the vulnerable
services on the server systems in the SDN?
• Q3: How can we measure the effectiveness of moving target defenses in
the SDN?
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Addressing the research question Q1: To address the research question
Q1, a flexible random virtual IP multiplexing (named FRVM) is developed and
presented in Chapter 3. FRVM is a novel SDN-based MTD mechanism that is
developed to thwart network reconnaissance and scanning attacks by effectively
shuffling of the virtual IP addresses. It enables a host to have multiple virtual
IP addresses that are multiplexed to a real IP address of the host and frequently
changes the virtual IP addresses. SDN-based architecture, mapping algorithms,
and communication protocols are developed and implemented in a virtualized
network created using Mininet [91] emulator. The comparative analysis of the
performance is evaluated via simulation experiments using the security and
performance metrics and discussed results.
Addressing the research question Q2: To address the research question
Q2, a proactive SDN-based MTD technique (named RHSM) is developed and
presented in Chapter 4. RHSM hides both network and transport layer’s
attributes (e.g., IP address and port numbers) of the end-hosts in the SDN and
provides end-to-end (e.,g., service-to-service) secure communication tunnel. It
provides high network diversity by obfuscating the end-hosts’ real identities,
which significantly disturbs the attacker’s scanning strategies and accordingly
results in minimizing the attacker’s success. Like FRVM, the architecture of
RHSM and multiplexing (e.g., hosts and services) algorithms are developed for
effective realizing of deploying it in SDNs. The performance of the RHSM is
evaluated via simulations to analyze the effect of port address space scanned by
attackers under varying the number of vulnerable services. Also, the overhead
upon the operation of the RHSM in terms of the flow table size, the frequency of
flow rules modifications, and the performance of an SDN controller is discussed.
Addressing the research question Q3: To address the research question
Q3, a new suite of dynamic security metrics are developed and presented
in Chapter 5. These security metrics are developed to capture the dynamic
changes in a network over time, which are used to measure the effectiveness of
the deployed MTD mechanism in SDNs. A variability represents the changing
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pattern of the networks and/or systems’ information (e.g., IP, ports, topology,
paths, vulnerabilities). The metrics are grouped into three classes as they based
on different kinds of security information and attack behaviors (e.g., network
address, paths or topology, and attack stage). Network and/or system’s
configurations information (e.g., network state) is captured at different points of
time and computed the variability for a scanning time window. T-HARM [47]
is used to capture the path information of a network over time. Extensive
simulations are performed and analyzed how the key parameters affect MTD
based on the metrics and discussed the overall trends of results. Besides, the
relationship between the metrics is discussed with the simulation results.
6.2 Limitations and Future Work
In this research, there are some limitations that can be investigated in
future work in order to extend the research scope. In this section, we discuss
the limitations of this research and the possible future work.
6.2.1 MTD for Emerging Network Technologies
Although all the developed MTD approaches (e.g., presented FRVM in
Chapter 3, and RHSM in Chapter 4) and set of dynamic security metrics
(e.g., presented in Chapter 5) of this thesis are typically based on SDN
environments [136], the development of the MTD approaches can be further
extended for securing the others emerging networked systems (e.g., Cloud, IoT,
CPS). In this section, we discuss how the MTD approaches can be further
developed in other emerging networked systems to increase the scope of the
research.
MTD for Cloud Computing: The homogeneous computing
infrastructures of cloud computing provides consistent and uniform quality
services to their clients. However, maintaining the homogeneous computing
infrastructure for uniform management of computing resources/services which
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can lead the system more vulnerable [56]. MTD techniques can be explored to
mitigate those security vulnerabilities or failure of the clouds. Various MTD
approaches (e.g., shuffling of server replicas [80], VM migration [41, 122, 170],
platform diversity / migration [24, 25], etc.) have been proposed for the
clouds. However, the approaches are limited in changing configurations of
system components, rather than shuffling of the network addresses or topology.
Also, the MTD approaches (e.g., FRVM, RHSM) presented in this thesis are
developed for the systems based on the SDNs. Therefore, it is important to
investigate how new shuffling MTD approaches based on network addresses
(e.g., IP address, ports) can be developed and deployed in the clouds. The
newer cloud technologies (e.g., SDN-based Clouds [145]) provide effective
deploying the MTD techniques in clouds strengthens not only security but also
encourages innovation that leverages a new way of handling and managing
dynamic configurations and infrastructure. With those technologies being
leveraged, deploying the MTD techniques in clouds are more feasible for smaller
and medium business houses as wellWang as big enterprises and government,
which is highly scalable and cost-effective. However, it is inevitable to face
challenges to make a good balance between security and performance in terms of
minimizing security vulnerabilities and defense costs while maximizing service
availability.
MTD for the Internet of Things (IoT): The advancement of IoT
technologies have contributed to developing innovative applications in various
domains, including cybersecurity [131]. However, due to its large scale
and severe resource constraints relying on limited bandwidth and/or power,
conventional security defense mechanisms (e.g., endpoint anti-virus software)
has shown its limitations for applicability in IoT environments. Therefore,
the threats or attacks encountered in IoT environments have been hurdles in
providing seamless, normal services and operation of IoT-based systems [53].
The work presented in this thesis is typically based on the SDN-based enterprise
network and did not consider any characteristics and constraints of the IoT
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networks. Also, MTD mechanisms are emerging new technologies that can
provide the capability to protect the IoT systems [26, 142, 167]). Thus, it is
possible to extend our defense approaches presented in this thesis (Chapter 3
and 4) as proactive security defense mechanisms and for the IoT-based
networks. Moreover, MTD makes the attackers harder to map the devices,
exploit their vulnerabilities and launch the attacks. However, the constraints
on IoT devices (e.g., CPU, energy consumption, memory) and network (e.g.,
low-bandwidth, high packet-loss) limit the effectiveness of MTD in IoT-based
environments.
MTD for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS): The CPS (e.g., automobiles,
medical devices, smart grids) plays an important role in critical infrastructure,
government, and everyday life [115]. The advance of CPS has been made
along with increased cyber capabilities in terms of communications, networking,
sensing, and computing as well as enhanced capabilities of physical systems
with materials, hardware, and/or sensors/actuators [126]. The CPS also
increases cybersecurity risks and attack surfaces, consequences of cyberattacks,
which severe impact on human life. MTD approaches discussed in Chapters 3
and 4 of this thesis did not consider the characteristics of the CPS. Therefore,
proactive security defense approaches are needed for strengthening the security
and resilience of the CPS. Some MTD approaches (e.g., IP-hopping, MT6D)
have been proposed to protect supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) system [121, 153], and smart gridsGroat et al. [59]. SCADA-based
systems are generally used for monitoring and controlling physical devices
span in large geographic distances, which are part of national infrastructures
(e.g., water distribution, oil and natural gas pipelines, power grids, and
transportation systems) and are critical to a nation’s economy and safety.
Leveraging the SDN technology for MTD approaches to SCADA systems
can protect the CPS system with an additional layer of defenses. However,
effective deployment of the MTD mechanisms should not adversely impact
the core performance of a system, including safety, reliability, availability, and
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predictability in running the operational services of the CPS.
6.2.2 Dynamic and Adaptable MTD Approaches
The state-of-the-art shuffling MTD techniques (e.g., [3], [74], [10], [99]) have
been mostly used a fixed MTD interval time for changing the attack surfaces
of the system. Although the MTD approaches presented in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4 of this thesis are proactive defense mechanisms, they still have used
fixed MTD interval time since they change IP addresses and/or ports of the
target system periodically with a certain fixed interval time. With a fixed
MTD interval time, an attacker can easily learn how the attack surfaces (
e.g., IP, ports, vulnerability) of the target system are being changed over time.
Hence, investigating how MTD shuffling interval time can be made dynamic and
adaptable to disrupt the chance of learning of the attacker and reduce the attack
success could be a promising future research direction. The adaptable MTD
shuffling strategy can be achieved based on the level of system vulnerabilities or
attack patterns which requires the advanced detection mechanisms (e.g., IDS,
IPS) or learning capability (e.g., Machine learning [49], Deep learning [134],
Re-enforcement learning [171]) in a defending system.
6.2.3 Optimizing MTD Shuffling Frequency
MTD shuffling frequency (or MTD interval) significantly impacts on the
security of the deployed MTD mechanism, which has been studied and
discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. However, the optimization of the shuffling
frequency is not discussed in this research. The optimal shuffling frequency
determination is a key challenge issue in the current shuffling-based MTD
researches [21]. Therefore, it is crucial to determine the optimal shuffling
frequency that minimizes the cost of network hardening. Different approaches
(e.g., Genetic-algorithm [160, 36, 38, 97], Machine-learning [134, 49, 146],
and Game-theoretic [25, 135, 50, 161]) are widely used for modeling and
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optimization of MTD problems.
GA-based MTD approaches can be used for identifying the optimal
deployment of system configurations where evolutionary algorithms such as
genetic algorithms (GAs) are often used to generate system configurations with
high diversity for maximizing system security [177].
Machine-learning (ML)-based approaches can be used to hinder an
attacker’s learning or select the best defense strategy. Besides, the multi-
objective reinforcement learning algorithm can be used to minimize the attack
surface of a system [152]. ML-based MTD allows a system to capture evolving
attack patterns with high scalability and applicability. However, as the
performance of ML often requires a large amount of data for training to
guarantee a certain level of prediction accuracy, then when there is a lack
of data, the performance is less than desired even with high overhead and
complexity.
Game theory is a mathematical model that allows modeling conflict and
cooperation between two or more rational decision-makers (e.g., players).
Game-theoretic approaches have been commonly used in modeling the
interactions between an attacker and a defender in designing MTD techniques.
Hence, in terms of the defender’s perspective, the key goal of an MTD strategy
is to identify a set of optimal system configuration policies to shift the attack
surface, which can minimize risk and/or damage introduced by an action by
the attacker [172]. On the other hand, the attacker aims to successfully launch
its attack with minimum effort and maximum effectiveness in achieving its
objectives. Hence, a two-player game well models the competition scenario
between the attacker and the MTD-based defender. Different games (e.g.,
Markov [94], Bayesian Stackelberg [135], Stochastic [104]) can be formulated
based on attacker behaviours and system models considered. The game-
theoretic approaches can provide an effective way to consider each player’s
learning and, accordingly, their adaptive behavior to maximize their utility.
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6.2.4 Advanced Attack Behaviors
We defined an attacker model and made assumptions for the attacker’s
capabilities and attack types considered in this research. We considered an
external attacker with some knowledge toward the target system and the
deployed defense mechanisms (e.g., IP and port address space range, MTDs)
and repeatedly scanned the target system. However, real-world attacker can
have different skills (e.g., adaptive [80]) and attack behaviors (e.g., APT [18],
epidemic worms [178], DDoS [147]) which are not considered in our model.
Also, as demonstrated in Section 2.3.3, most attack behaviors considered in
the existing MTDs occur during the reconnaissance stage, which implies that
MTD mainly deals with outside attackers as its primary goal is to protect
a system before they break into the system. This significantly limits the
applicability of MTD techniques, although MTD can enhance system security
and performance by dealing with attackers beyond the reconnaissance stage
(e.g., inside attackers). Therefore, proposed approaches of this thesis can be
extended in the future considering a different type of attackers (e.g., insiders,
adaptive attackers) and attack behaviors (e.g., APT, DDoS, epidemic attacks).
6.2.5 Performability Metrics
We developed a comprehensive set of dynamic security metrics for MTDs
and presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis, which can be used to assess and
evaluate the effectiveness of the deployed MTD mechanism in terms of security
aspects of the networked systems. These metrics did not take performability
(e.g., performance and availability) measurement into account. The impact
of the deployed MTD on system performance and service availability (e.g.,
operational delay, connection drop) can be a critical design trade-off between
security and performance. Thus, designing performability metrics (e.g.,
delay [110, 168], connection loss [23]) for measuring the effectiveness of MTD
mechanisms in SDN could be a potential future research direction.
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6.2.6 Validation in a real SDN-testbed
The proposed approaches have been validated via simulation experiments in
a virtualized SDN environment using Mininet [91] emulator with a Ryu [133]
controller. The simulation environment was set up as close as real network
settings and experiments carried out with the use of the existing vulnerability
database (e.g., NVD [113], but one of the limitations of this thesis is the lack
of deployment in a real SDN-testbed for the validation. A limited number of
existing SDN-based MTD work used a real SDN-testbed [103, 65, 158]. Real





The static configuration of the conventional networked systems provides
asymmetric advantages to attackers so that they have enough time to study
towards the target systems, identify vulnerabilities, and make a successful
attack plan. MTD approaches have been evolved for creating the asymmetric
uncertainty (i.e., asymmetric disadvantages) to the attackers by continuously
and dynamically changing the networks or systems’ configuration over time,
therefore, harder to explore and predict. Also, flexibility and programmability
features of software-defined networking facilitate to implement various
cybersecurity network applications. There is a lack of proactive and dynamic
defense mechanisms that dynamically reconfigure or change the networked
systems’ properties (e.g., IP, ports, topology) for protecting the software-
defined networks. Similarly, there are no suitable security metrics that capture
the network dynamics and measure the effectiveness of the deployed moving
target defense mechanisms in the software-defined networks. This thesis
identified three major problems in the existing network address shuffling-
based MTD mechanisms and security metrics that can be used to measure the
effectiveness of the MTD mechanisms deployed in software-defined networks.
First, the existing network address shuffling MTD mechanisms are posing
problems in the mapping of the IP addresses or port numbers of the networked
systems. Secondly, current security defense mechanisms are unable to obfuscate
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both hosts and vulnerable services of the target systems. Also, they are often
deployed in conventional networked environments. Thirdly, the security metrics
have been designed form the general system security perspective, so they
are unable to capture and measure the dynamics of the networked systems
introduced by the shuffling or reconfiguration event of the deployed MTD
mechanisms.
So, in this research, following four distinct key contributions to knowledge
in the development of moving target defense approaches and dynamic security
metrics are made.
1. A new MTD approach has been developed for shuffling of the IP
addresses of server machines and thwarting reconnaissance and scanning
cyberattacks in the SDNs. A flexible IP shuffling mechanism called,
FRVM was developed that provides an efficient method of mapping (i.e.,
multiplexing) or remapping (i.e., de-multiplexing) between virtual and
real IP addresses of the servers, where each server machine can have
multiple, random, time-variant IP addresses which creates an extremely
diverse environment that significantly decreases attacker success. System
architecture, address mapping algorithms, and communication protocols
of the FRVM defense mechanism were developed. A proof-of-concept
FRVM was implemented on SDN testbed (e.g., Mininet) in developing a
separate SDN controller, named FRVM controller.
2. A comprehensive performance evaluation of the FRVM has been
presented. A comparative study of the security and overhead of the
FRVM with a typical static network counterpart was described using
security metrics (e.g., attacker’s scanning success probability, deterrence)
and performance metrics (e.g., delay, throughput) respectively. The
probabilistic analytical models were derived for both dynamic networks
with FRVM and a typical static network without FRVM. The results were
analyzed with the impact of key parameters (e.g., MTD interval time, no.
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of vulnerable hosts, address space size) on security in terms of attacker
success to scan and explore vulnerabilities in the target systems.
3. A proactive and dynamic SDN-based defense mechanism, RHSM has
been developed for obfuscating both host’s and services’ identities
and defending against the reconnaissance and scanning attacks in the
SDN. The flexible address multiplexing concept of the FRVM defense
mechanism has been adopted in the RHSM approach to map both IP
addresses and port numbers of the end-hosts. The performance of the
RHSM comparatively analyzed with a static counterpart network in terms
of attack success probability with the existence of the different number
of vulnerable services and overhead of flow update.
4. A new suite of dynamic security metrics for measuring the effectiveness
of MTD has been developed. These metrics captured the dynamics of
SDN-based networked systems’ properties (e.g., IP address, ports, attack
paths, topology) that are used to estimate the systems’ variability at
different time points. The developed metrics were categorized into three
classes (e.g., network address based, attack paths based, and attack stages
based) based on information they used and attack behaviors considered.
Examples and simulation experiments were used to identify the key
factors that significantly impact on the performance of the deploying
MTD techniques in the SDNs.
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S. Azodolmolky, and S. Uhlig. Software-Defined Networking: A
Comprehensive Survey. Proc. IEEE, 103(1):14–76, Jan. 2015.
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